Griffin v. Wainwright’s Empirical Analysis
760 F.2d 1505 · 1985
Citation profile
25 federal appellate · 1 district · 12 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 65 later decisions — most recently August 2019 · most notably Waters v. Thomas (1995), Lindsey v. Smith (1987)
25 federal appellate · 1 district · 12 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Wainwright v. Sykes · Townsend v. Sain · Cuyler v. Sullivan · Lockett v. Ohio
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 65 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“'Brevity of time spent in consultation, without more, does not establish that counsel was ineffective. Easter v. Estelle , 609 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1980). Thus, it is not enough for Griffin to allege that counsel only met with him once before trial”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““Federal habeas has been a source of friction between state and federal courts and Congress obviously meant to alleviate some of that friction when it enacted subsection (d) in 1966 as an amendment to the original Federal Habeas Act of 1867 ... A writ issued at the behest of a petitioner under 28 USC 2254 is in effect overturning either the factual or legal conclusions reached by the state-court system under the judgment of which the petitioner stands convicted and friction is a likely result____ But, it is clear that in adopting the 1966 amendment, Congress in Section 2254(d) intended not only to minimize that inevitable friction but also to establish that the findings made by the state-court system ‘shall be presumed’ to be correct’ unless one of seven conditions specifically set forth in Section 2254(d) was found to exist by the federal habeas court. If none of those seven conditions were found to exist, or unless the habeas court concludes that the relevant state-court determination is not ‘fairly supported by the record’, ‘the burden shall rest upon the applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. (Emphasis added)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.