United States v. Jefferson’s Empirical Analysis
760 F.2d 821 · 1985
Citation profile
32 federal appellate · 2 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 42 later decisions — most recently April 2014 · most notably United States v. Vontsteen (1992), United States v. Shue (1987)
32 federal appellate · 2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 846 (§ 406 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 848 (§ 408 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 28 U.S.C. § 2106
Relies on North Carolina v. Pearce · United States v. DiFrancesco · United States v. Goodwin · Colten v. Commonwealth of Kentucky · Jones v. Howard
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 42 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), the United States Supreme Court held that an increased sentence could not be imposed after retrial without violating the due process rights of the defendant, unless the sentencing judge gave as reasons objective factors involving identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. United States v. Tucker, 581 F.2d 602 (7th Cir.1978). The rule is a prophylactic one, addressed more to the ‘chill’ that vindictiveness might throw over the inclination of future litigants to appeal than to the injustice done in the actual case. For that reason, Pearce creates a presumption of vindictiveness, and allow sentences to be increased only where the sentencing judge makes clear that the increase is based on behavior of the defendant since the original sentencing. The judge may not rely on a reconsideration of the conduct that led to the original sentence .... ””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“We do not decide here whether, in a context ... in which the various counts are not interrelated],] ... increasing the sentence on one count to compensate for a vacated illegal sentence would violate due process under [North Carolina v.] Pearce, [ 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969)]); McClain v. United States, 676 F.2d 915 , 918 (2d Cir.1982) (accepting this Court’s holding in Busic that”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“We see no reason to distinguish, on the basis of [the Pearce ] rationale, the case of resentencing after retrial from the case of resentencing after vacation of an illegal sentence. The same threat of vindictiveness is present, and the same safeguards are necessary.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.