Lipsig v. Ramlawi’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 district · 24 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “neither an agent nor an employee can conspire with his or her corporate principal or employer”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. HRCC, Ltd. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int'l (Usa), Inc. · 820 So. 2d 963 - Richard Bertram, Inc. v. Sterling Bank & Trust

2. “a personal stake in the activities that are separate and distinct from the corporation's interest.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 367 F. Supp. 3d 1360 - Orange Lake Country Club, Inc. v. Reed Hein & Assocs., LLC · 924 So. 2d 862 - Valdes v. GAB Robins North America, Inc.

3. “Florida law also uniformly holds that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, an attorney in Florida has the actual and apparent authority to speak and to act for his client only in those matters necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of the purpose of the lawyer’s retention. See, e.g., State ex rel. Personal Finance Co. v. Lewis, 140 Fla. 86 , 191 So. 295, 296 (1939) (reasoning that “... in matters of procedure or practice which affect solely the conduct of a cause, an attorney may bind his client • • • [.]”); Johnson v. Estate of Fraedrich, 472 So.2d 1266, 1268 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (holding that “an attorney is generally viewed as the agent of his client. An act done by an agent on behalf of the principal within the scope of the agency is not the act of the agent but of the person by whose direction it is done[ ]”) (citations omitted); Mendelsund v. Southern-Aire Coats of Fla., Inc., 210 So.2d 229, 231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (holding that “there is a presumption that an attorney, as an officer of the court, is duly authorized to act for a client whom he professes to represent.”); Epperson v. Rupp, 157 So.2d 537, 538 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963) (reasoning that “an attorney is an agent for his client” and accordingly, for example in probate proceedings, the attorney can “sign an ‘objection’ to a claim, the same as he may institute a suit for a client without the client’s signature or file a claim in an estate without the client’s signature.”).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 672 F. Supp. 2d 1217 - Mitchell Co., Inc. v. Campus