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← 760 SW2D 33 - Urbano v. State

Urbano v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1988

Citation profile

12
cited by 12 later decisions
1
states following
October 1998
most recently cited

12 state decisions

Appellate journey

reviewedthe decision below (from Texas 178th Judicial District Court)

Relationships

Relies on Mahan & Rowsey, Inc. v. Oklahoma Natural Gas · David W. McKay v. Texas · Rose v. State · Alejandro v. State · Todd v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In Urbano , this Court said: In concluding our analysis, we note that appellant received a sentence of 99 years confinement. The trial court instructed the jury that the maximum punishment possible was 99 years or life. Although appellant did not receive that maximum sentence (life), he did receive the next most severe sentence — 99 years. This fact, too, indicates that appellant suffered harm. In Villanueva , this Court said: The jury’s assessment of the maximum punishment indicates their abhorrence for the perpetrators of the crime. The charge instructed the jury that appellant would not “become eligible for parole until the actual time served equals one-third of the sentence imposed or twenty years, whichever is less, without any consideration of any good conduct time....” The jury knew, therefore, that appellant would be eligible for parole in 20 years, whether they assessed a sentence of 60 years (Vs of 60 = 20) or 99 years. They nevertheless assessed the longer sentence knowing it would not delay appellant’s parole eligibility date. Thus, at least the last 39 years of appellant’s 99-year sentence cannot be attributed to the parole instruction.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “[Article 35.11] mandates one shuffle based upon the timely request of one of the three listed qualified movants, or it may be based upon separate timely requests of two or three of them. We hold the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to shuffle in this case because the jury panel had been shuffled on the timely request of the State’s counsel.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.