Tongol v. Donovan’s Empirical Analysis
762 F.2d 727 · 1985
Citation profile
16 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 2412 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1988 · 5 U.S.C. § 504 (Equal Access to Justice Act)
Relies on Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond · Hannahville Indian Community v. United States · United States v. McConney · Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club · PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“These latter courts merely applied the general principle of Bradley v. School Board, 416 U.S. 696 , 94 S.Ct. 2006 , 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974) (Bradley), “that a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless ... there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary,” id. at 711 , 94 S.Ct. at 2016 , without considering the difference between the purpose and effect of the Act and the statute at issue in Bradley. The Supreme Court articulated the Bradley principle as justification for allowing a group of civil rights plaintiffs to obtain attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 718 of the Education Amendments of 1972 ..., even though the only issue pending on that section’s effective date was the propriety of an attorneys’ fee award. 416 U.S. at 709-11 , 94 S.Ct. at 2015-16 . In Bradley, however, the Court did not face any potential waiver of sovereign immunity requiring application of the principle of narrow construction. By contrast, when this principle applies as it does with the Act, it harmonizes with the Bradley principle to require the narrowest interpretation of the sovereign immunity waiver not inconsistent with “statutory direction or legislative history.” Id. at 711 , 94 S.Ct. at 2016 . This result is required by the latest teaching of the Supreme Court that “[w]aivers of immunity must be ‘construed strictly in favor of the sovereign,’ and not ‘enlarge[d] ... beyond what the language requires.’ ” Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club ], 463 ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent“We believe the District of Columbia [Nichols decision] and Seventh Circuits [Highways decision] more closely reflect the approach mandated by [the] latest teachings of the Supreme Court. The Eighth Circuit’s opinion [Heydt] is devoid of any statutory analysis, and the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion [KKK] is hampered by a failure to heed principles of narrow construction.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Jones v. Brown“more closely reflect[ed] the approach mandated by latest teachings of the Supreme Court,”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.