Brown v. Stephens’s Empirical Analysis
762 F.3d 454 · 2014
Citation profile
14
cited by 14 later decisions
1
states following
July 2019
most recently cited
11 federal appellate · 1 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 3599
Relies on Herrera v. Collins · Harbison v. Bell · Smith v. Dretke · Woodward v. Epps · Riley v. Dretke
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[Cjonsideration must be given to the nature and purpose of clemency proceedings. The clemency process takes place only after all judicial proceedings have been completed. In capital cases, such judicial proceedings include, at a minimum, trial, direct appeal, state post-conviction review, and federal habeas review, in all of which proceedings indigent prisoners are provided with legal representation and investigative and expert assistance at taxpayer expense. Clemency “proceedings are a matter of grace entirely distinct from judicial proceedings.” Harbison, 556 U.S. at 192 , 129 S.Ct. 1481 . “Clemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of law, and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been exhausted.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 , 411-12, 113 S.Ct. 853 , 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993) (footnote omitted). Thus, when a petitioner requests funds for investigative services for the purpose of clemency proceedings, the petitioner must show that the requested services are reasonably necessary to provide the Governor and Board of Pardons and Paroles the information they need in order to determine whether to exercise their discretion to extend grace to the petitioner in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“"Fees and expenses paid for investigative, expert, and other reasonably necessary services authorized under” 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (f) are ordinarily limited to $7,500. Id. § 3599(g)(2). Fees and expenses may exceed $7,500 only if "payment in excess of that limit is certified by the court,” the payment is "necessary to provide fair compensation for services of an unusual character or duration, and the amount of the excess payment is approved by the chief judge of the circuit.” Id.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Wilkins v. Davis“Fees and expenses paid for investigative, expert, and other reasonably necessary services authorized under” 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (f) are ordinarily limited to $7,500. Id. § 3599(g)(2). Fees and expenses may exceed $7,500 only if”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Wilkins v. Davis
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.