concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part">SULLIVAN, Judge,

concurring in result in part and dissenting in part.

I agree with the majority that the evidence is sufficient to prove that Wise had the requisite intent for the conviction. However, I respectfully disagree with the majority in its reliance upon Pedrick v. State, 593 N.E.2d 1213 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) as authority for our holding. (See id. at 1223 (Sullivan, J., dissenting)).

As to the denial of defendant's peremptory challenge, I respectfully dissent. In the case before us, counsel for defendant clearly wished to exeuse the juror who had indicated that he thought the criminal justice system was too easy on criminals and on sentences for serious crimes. However, when counsel apparently decided that a challenge for cause would not be successful, counsel inadvertently failed to exercise a peremptory challenge as to that juror and accepted him.

When the second round of questioning began with respect to the six newly-impaneled prospective jurors, defense counsel realized his error as to Juror 10 and so advised the court. The court stated that they would proceed with that second round of questioning and then would revisit the matter as to a peremptory challenge of Juror 10, because she did not "want to let him go right this second, because that's what I'm going to do." Transcript at 76. This exchange indicated that at the subsequent time the peremptory challenge would be permitted. However, the court apparently changed her mind and chose to enforce the local rule.

I think it important to note that only the first round of questioning of the panel had been completed. The voir dire process for impaneling the jury had not been completed. Defendant had not used all available peremptory challenges. No prejudice or undue delay would have been occasioned either to the State or to the Court. The situation is closely akin to that of a trial *480court ruling made in fier? and which is subject to modification or recall.

Under the cireumstances present here, which were not presented in either Marsh v. State, 272 Ind. 178, 396 N.E.2d 883 (1979) or McBrady v. State, 459 N.E.2d 719 (Ind.1984), rigid application of the local rule which gives finality to an inadvertent and preliminary acceptance of a certain member of the panel constitutes an abuse of discretion.

I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

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