State v. Gerschoffer

¶1concurring in part and dissenting in part:

¶2I join Part I and, except as noted below, Part II of the majority opinion. I respectfully dissent, however, to Part III, believing that the particular roadblock challenged here was not unreasonable in the totality of the cireumstances.

¶3Quoting from the dissenting opinion in State v. Garcia, 500 N.E.2d 158, 167 (Ind.1986)(Shepard, J., dissenting), the majority declares: "A seizure is not reasonable unless it is well calculated to effectuate its purpose." Maj. op. at 967. And near the close of Part II, the majority asserts that one of the proper considerations in determining the constitutional reasonableness of a roadblock is whether it "effectively targets a serious danger specific to vehicular operation." Maj. op. at 966. Later, in Part III, the majority proceeds to consider effectiveness when evaluating this roadblock. Maj. op. at 970-71. Whether a roadblock is "well calculated" to be efficacious is not, in my opinion, a significant factor to be considered in the determination of roadblock reasonableness.1

¶4Finally, I do not share the majority's critical view of the Mishawaka roadblock's objective, location, and timing; the lack of compelled uniformity regarding the officers' approaching and screening of motorists; the lack of sufficient avoidability; and the lack of sufficient effectiveness. Notwithstanding the possible excessive average length of detention, I believe that the record establishes that the roadblock was not unreasonable in the totality of the circumstances. In my judgment, the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress.