Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

763 S.W.2d 8

Baluch v. O'DONNELL

This page is marked noindex.

Texas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas) · decided 1988-09-21

Relies on Jampole v. Touchy · Proffer v. Yates · Street v. Second Court of Appeals

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1988-09-21

How this case has been cited

Cited by 9 later decisions — most recently December 2002

9 state decisions

60198819902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

THOMAS, Justice,

¶1dissenting.

¶2I agree with the majority that the trial court exceeded its authority in striking Ba-luch’s pleadings pursuant to Rule 215(2)(b) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. I further agree with the conclusion that it is inappropriate for us to address the issue of the entry of the initial order awarding interim attorney’s fees because Baluch has an adequate remedy on appeal. I cannot agree, however, that the mandamus should be granted because in my opinion, Baluch has failed to establish his right to mandamus relief.

¶3MANDAMUS AS A REMEDY

¶4The threshold inquiry should be whether mandamus is the appropriate vehicle to attack the order striking the pleadings under the facts and circumstances presented to this Court. There are two prongs to the test for granting a petition for writ of mandamus. The first is whether the trial court’s ruling demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion. The second, equally important, prong is whether there is an adequate remedy by appeal. Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 572-573 (Tex.1984), and authorities cited therein. This Court has no authority to grant mandamus when an adequate remedy at law exists by direct appeal. The wrongful imposition of sanctions is subject to review by direct appeal after final judgment. Central Freight Line v. White, 731 S.W.2d 121, 121-22 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987) (orig. proceeding). When an appellate court grants relief absent an abuse of discretion and absent an adequate remedy at law, it acts in excess of its writ power. Street v. Second Court of Appeals, 715 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Tex.1986). The majority *12opinion focuses only on whether there was an abuse of discretion by the trial court in striking Baluch’s pleadings. Having concluded that the order striking the pleadings was “arbitary, capricious and beyond the authority granted under the rules of civil procedure,” the majority is prepared to conditionally grant the writ and any further inquiry is nonexistent. Perhaps the majority avoids any discussion concerning inadequate remedy by appeal, because at this point in time we do not know exactly what is going to happen in the trial court.

¶5BALUCH’S BASIS FOR REQUESTING RELIEF

¶6Baluch, the father, argues that his request for immediate temporary relief is necessary because as a result of his failure to pay the interim attorney’s fees to the mother of his child, the trial court entered an order striking his pleadings and he is now facing a motion for summary judgment. The record reflects that four and one-half months after the trial court entered its order striking Baluch's pleadings, the mother filed a motion for summary judgment seeking:

(1) additional attorney’s fees of $28,-518.92 as necessary expenses on behalf of the child, plus the original $25,000 in interim fees for a total of $53,518.92 in attorney’s fees;
(2) that she be named managing conservator of the minor child; and the father be named possessory conservator;
(3) that the father’s visitation be restricted and supervised in Dallas County;
(4) that the father be ordered to pay $2,000 per month child support;
(5) that the court enter a finding that there is a putative marriage and thereupon order a division of the community property acquired during the common law marriage; and
(6) that the father be ordered to provide information on a trust fund he established for the benefit of the child.

¶7Baluch argues that mandamus is the only avenue of relief in light of the possibility that a summary judgment will be granted. It is further contended that because this is a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the striking of pleadings is such an extreme action that it defies what may well be in the best interest of the child. Baluch finally asserts that if the trial court grants the summary judgment, the child will no doubt be made the ultimate victim. Thus, it is apparent that Baluch is truly objecting to the order he anticipates will result from the hearing on the motion for summary judgment.

¶8While Proffer v. Yates, 734 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.1987), cited by the majority, seems to indicate that a remedy by appeal is inadequate when the case concerns the parent-child relationship or child support issues, mandamus issued in that case to direct the trial judge to perform a mandatory act of transfering venue to the proper court for judicial economy. This case does not involve the performance of a mandatory act. In fact, as I view the proceedings at this point, in order to grant the relief which Baluch requests, we must:

(1) assume that the trial court is going to grant a summary judgment;
(2) assume that Baluch will not be able to appeal the granting of the summary judgment or that such an appeal will be inadequate;
(3) assume that the trial court is not going to abide by the clear mandate of section 14.07 of the Texas Family Code and consider “the best interest of the child” as the primary consideration in determining the. questions of conserva-torship and support;
(4) assume that the guardian ad litem previously appointed will not participate in the proceedings to further protect the best interests of the child; and
(5) assume that all of these projected decisions by the trial court will have adverse consequences upon the minor child.

¶9Thus, we must pile assumption upon assumption in order to grant the relief which is requested. If the trial court did all of the assumed actions which Baluch anticipates, I would be the first to say that intervention by this Court would be appropriate; however, mandamus should not be *13granted based upon anticipated results and speculation.

¶10CONCLUSION

¶11It is not our function to referee the constant and myriad decisions a trial court makes in proceeding from the filing of a cause of action to final judgment. W.W. Rodgers & Sons Produce Co. v. Johnson, 673 S.W.2d 291, 293 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984) (orig. proceeding). Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and should never be granted unless the relator proves a clear right to the writ. See Gonzales v. Stevens, 427 S.W.2d 694, 701 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1968) (orig. proceeding). For these reasons, I would deny the petition for writ of mandamus.

/763/sw2d/8 · .json · Public domain