Briggs v. Procunier’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Like the death-sentencing procedure discussion in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 [ 101 S.Ct. 1852 , 68 L.Ed.2d 270 ] (1981), the Texas scheme requires the state to prove at trial, beyond a reasonable doubt, the predicate facts, two prior convictions, necessary for the imposition of the harsher sentence. `The two prior convictions must be alleged in the indictment, and upon review the allegations are treated the same as allegations of the elements of a substantive offense.' [Citation.] Therefore, if the state fails to introduce sufficient evidence of the defendant's status as an habitual offender at a first trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the sentencing of the defendant as an habitual offender at a second trial.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 16 Cal. 4th 826 - People v. Monge

2. “once the state has failed to prove that the defendant is an habitual offender with respect to a predicate offense, for example, the [aggravated robbery] here, it may not seek to sentence him as an habitual offender for the underlying crime.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Millard v. Lynaugh

3. “if the state fails to introduce sufficient evidence of the defendant's status as a habitual offender at a first trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the sentencing of the defendant as a habitual offender at a second trial.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Durosko v. Lewis