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← 764 F.2d 786 - United States v. Kapperman

United States v. Kapperman’s Empirical Analysis

764 F.2d 786 · 1985

Citation profile

117
cited by 117 later decisions
15
states following
April 2021
most recently cited

40 federal appellate · 5 district · 24 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 117 later decisions — most recently April 2021 · most notably United States v. Perdue (1993), United States v. Shareef (1996)

40 federal appellate · 5 district · 24 state decisions — followed in 15 states

40019851990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 846 (§ 406 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 952 · 21 U.S.C. § 963

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Terry v. Ohio · Wong Sun v. United States · Schneckloth v. Bustamonte · Rakas v. Illinois

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 117 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"Yet, neither handcuffing nor other restraints will automatically convert a Terry stop into a de facto arrest requiring probable cause. Just as probable cause to arrest will not justify using excessive force to detain a suspect, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 , 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), the use of a particular method to restrain a person's freedom of movement does not necessarily make police action tantamount to an arrest. The inquiry in either context is reasonableness."”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The form authorized the agents “to conduct a complete search” of the car. The district court would read “complete” to mean “incomplete.” Furthermore, those agents were authorized “to take from [the] premises any letters, materials or other property which they may desire.” In the absence of the word “complete,” one might possibly construe the consent in a limited fashion, however, the addition of the word “complete” indicates that consent was extended to everything within the automobile. Such a construction is further supported by the permission given to the agents to remove items from the automobile. “Letters” and “papers” would not be expected to be lying around loose. They would be contained in something.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[p]olice may take reasonable action, based upon the circumstances, to protect themselves ... or to maintain the status quo.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.