764 So. 2d 1061 - Harper v. Layrisson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “No Cause of Action In reviewing a trial court's ruling sustaining an exception of no cause of action, the reviewing court subjects the case to a de novo review because the exception raises a question of law and the lower court's decision is based only on the sufficiency of the petition. Harper v. Layrisson, 99-0544, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/10/00), 764 So.2d 1061, 1064 . The peremptory exception pleading the objection of no cause of action is a procedural device used to test whether, under the allegations of the petition, the law affords any remedy for the grievance asserted. Id., 00-0544 [99-0544], p. 4, 764 So.2d at 1063 . Every reasonable interpretation must be accorded to the language of the petition in favor of maintaining the sufficiency of the petition and affording the litigant an opportunity to present his evidence. Id. The court should sustain the exception only if the law affords no remedy under any evidence that is admissible under the pleadings. Id., 99-0544, p. 5, 764 So.2d at 1063 . A petition should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of any claim which would entitle him to relief. Id. 99-0544, p. 5, 764 So.2d at 1063-64 . No Right of Action The peremptory exception pleading the objection of no right of action challenges whether plaintiff has an actual interest in bringing the action. Mayeaux v. Glover, 08-2031, pp. 4-5 (La.App.1/12/10), 31 So.3d 1090, 1093”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 62 So. 3d 759 - In Re Melancon

2. “At the outset, this court notes that none of the cases cited by the parties contain the particular factual circumstances presented herein. In this case, Stanley was booked and charged with several crimes, given a date upon which he was to return to court, and held on a $15,000.00 bond pending his return court date. At the time of the attack, he had not been convicted of any crime, nor had he escaped from the defendants’ custody. He was merely a pre-trial detainee being held in the parish jail pending his ability to make bond. Undisputedly, Stanley did not post bond in the amount set by the trial court, but was released from jail, without judicial authorization or review, three days after his arrest. Also, the acts allegedly giving rise to the claim for damages occurred two months after his release on a “sign out.” Thus, in determining whether or not the trial court erred in granting the exception, the issue presented for review is whether, as a matter of law, a defendant sheriff may ever be held civilly liable for the misconduct of a pretrial detainee purposefully released on his own recognizance by the sheriff despite a judicially set bond. [[Image here]] Citing Green v. State Through Department of Institutions, 91 So.2d 153 (La.App. 1st Cir.1956), and subsequent cases interpreting Green , the defendants contend that if no liability exists where the inmate escapes, (except under very narrow circumstances), there can be' no liability where the inmate is released on a recogniz”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 849 So. 2d 643 - Hebert v. Layrisson