765 F. Supp. 2d 783 - Jasper v. Thaler’s Empirical Analysis
2011
Citation profile
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · Miller-El v. Cockrell Director Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division · Batson v. Kentucky · Williams v. Taylor · Coleman v. Thompson
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“• He said that he believed the death penalty was appropriate in some cases but that he could never return a verdict which assessed the death penalty. In response to a question by the prosecution on that answer he responded by saying, “Well, it’s just that I can’t play the role of God. I can’t send nobody, you know, to death.” • In reference to the prosecutor saying that “you personally could not be involved as one of the twelve jurors who would ever answer those questions in such a way as a man’s life would be taken,” Galloway answered, “I don’t believe I can. But if I have to, I can make a decision.” • To follow up, the prosecutor asked: “If you were selected to sit as a juror in this case, could you answer those three punishment questions in such a way that you would know that the result of the way you answered those question that a man would be sentenced to death?” Galloway replied, “Yes.” • It was revealed that he had answered ‘Tes” and “too often” in reference to a question of whether the death penalty was ever misused. On follow up, he indicated that he thought innocent men had been executed and their innocence was not discovered until it was too late. • According to the questionnaire, Galloway’s greatest fear was that he would not have enough evidence to decide a case. Upon explanation by the prosecution of the burden of proof required in the trial, Galloway indicated that he would have to personally ask questions to eliminate reasonable doubt in his mind if he felt th”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“The facts of this crime were brutal and demonstrated calculated deliberation. Appellant planned well in advance the stabbing murder of someone he would later describe as “one of the nicest people [he] ever met in [his] life.” He allowed Alejandro to assist him with recording for two hours, knowing he was about to kill him. As Alejandro sat unaware at the soundboard mixing a track for appellant, appellant pulled his head back and, taking a kitchen knife from his jacket, slit his throat from ear to ear. When that wound did not kill him, one of appellant’s accomplices joined the attack until Alejandro was dead. Alejandro suffered twenty-five stab wounds. Appellant quickly loaded equipment into the vans and instructed one stunned accomplice to hurry up and help. In addition to the facts of the crime itself, evidence adduced at trial of prior criminal history and lack of remorse support the jury’s finding. Appellant’s criminal history included incidents beginning at the age of fifteen, when he stole a bicycle. He was expelled from school for possession of marijuana and expelled from alternative school. More recently, he attempted a residential burglary and attacked the off-duty police officer who attempted to detain him and also attempted to evade police at a traffic stop, leading them on a high-speed chase. The evidence introduced by the State at trial shows a pattern of escalating criminal activity and an increasing proclivity to break laws posing threáts to the safety of others”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“This claim lacks merit. The United States Supreme Court has expressly rejected the argument that a state appellate court is required to independently re-weigh aggravating and mitigating evidence.. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 , 104 S.Ct. 871, 879 , 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984) (“There is thus no basis in our cases for holding that comparative proportionality review by an appellate court is required in every case in which the death sentence is imposed and the defendant, requests it.”). Both before and after the Supreme Court mandated judicial proportionality review of punitive damage awards in civil cases, the Fifth Circuit has consistently held no such “proportionality review” of a capital sentence is constitutionally mandated. See Martinez v. Johnson, 255 F.3d 229 , 241 n. 17 (5th Cir.2001) (recognizing there is no constitutional right to proportionality review), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1163 , 122 S.Ct. 1175 , 152 L.Ed.2d 118 (2002); Hughes v. Johnson, 191 F.3d 607, 622 (5th Cir.1999) (holding a state appellate court was not required to conduct proportionality review of a capital sentence), ce rt. denied, 528 U.S. 1145 , 120 S.Ct. 1003 , 145 L.Ed.2d 945 (2000); United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 354 (5th Cir.1998) (holding the Constitution does not require a comparison of the penalties imposed in similar criminal cases), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 829 , 120 S.Ct. 83 , 145 L.Ed.2d 70 (1999); Evans v. McCotter, 790 F.2d 1232, 1243 (5th Cir.) (holding there is no federal co”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Garza v. Thaler
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.