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← 766 F.3d 809 - Dansby v. Hobbs

Dansby v. Hobbs’s Empirical Analysis

766 F.3d 809 · 2014

Citation profile

27
cited by 27 later decisions
1
states following
August 2023
most recently cited

9 federal appellate · 1 district · 2 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Jackson v. Virginia · Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Brady v. State of Maryland · Slack v. McDaniel

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The Supreme Court has not decided whether a persuasive demonstration of actual innocence after trial would render unconstitutional a conviction and sentence that is otherwise free of constitutional error. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554-55 , 126 S.Ct. 2064 , 165 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006). The Court has established, however, that the threshold for any such claim, if it were recognized, would be “extraordinarily high.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 , 113 S.Ct. 853 , 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993). The threshold, if it exists, would require “more convincing proof’ than the “gateway” standard that allows for consideration of otherwise defaulted constitutional claims upon a showing of actual innocence. House, 547 U.S. at 555 , 126 S.Ct. 2064 ; see Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315 , 115 S.Ct. 851 , 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995). Thus, on a freestanding claim of actual innocence, it is not sufficient that a petitioner shows even that it is “more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 327 , 115 S.Ct. 851 . The “extraordinarily high” threshold, if recognized, would be even higher. House, 547 U.S. at 555 , 126 S.Ct. 2064 .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “(1) the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was a "substantial" claim; (2) the "cause" consisted of there being "no counsel" or only "ineffective" counsel during the state collateral review proceeding; and (3) the state collateral review proceeding was the "initial" review proceeding with respect to the "ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim."”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “The line between permissible references to postarrest silence for explanatory purposes and impermissible breaches of the implied Miranda -warning promise ... must emerge from case-by-case applications of Doyle over a period of time.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.