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766 So. 2d 1109

Docket Nos. 3D00-1106, 3D00-1104.

State v. Dawson

The STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Katracy DAWSON, Respondent.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided August 16, 2000.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 2000-08-16

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently August 2013

2 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 992 So. 2d 330 - State v. Williams

Relies on Rodriguez v. New York · 110 So. 2d 654 - Williams v. State · Amoros v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2000-08-16

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Lara Edelstein, Assistant Attorney General, for petitioner.

¶2Howard Sohn, Miami, for respondent.

¶3Before GODERICH, FLETCHER and SHEVIN, JJ.

¶4SHEVIN, Judge.

¶5In these consolidated cases, the State of Florida petitions for a writ of certiorari asking us to quash trial court orders denying the State's motions to introduce Williams Rule evidence in two cases pending prosecution in the trial court. We deny the petitions.

¶6In its well-reasoned order, the trial court correctly found that the proposed Williams Rule[1] evidence was not relevant and admissible to establish the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the subject offenses. See Dixon v. State, 627 So.2d 1337 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). The sole evidence that is similar among the two crimes are the nine-millimeter shell casings found at the scenes. Based on that comparison, the police showed the victim of the first crime a picture of defendant, who was arrested at the scene of the second offense; and the victim identified the person in the picture as the perpetrator. As the trial court correctly found, "even if the *1110 subject Williams Rule evidence is marginally relevant, its limited probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the Defendant...."

¶7The state's argument that this information is crucial to its case overlooks the fact that in the first case, no doubt the victim will identify the perpetrator, and in the second case the police will identify the perpetrator as the person they ran over. Also, in the second case, the victim's property was found on the perpetrator's person. Hence, this Williams Rule evidence is not the sole means for the state to prove identity. Moreover, contrary to the state's argument, Amoros v. State, 531 So.2d 1256 (Fla.1988), does not require that we grant certiorari in this case. The two crimes at issue here are "not intertwined inextricably as they were in Amoros." Dixon, 627 So.2d at 1339.

¶8In view of the foregoing, we cannot hold that the trial court abused its discretion in striking the Williams Rule notice. The state has not demonstrated that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of law in this case. See State v. Escobar, 570 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

¶9We find no merit in defendant's objection to admission of evidence that he was in possession of the gun when he was arrested.

¶10Certiorari denied.

NOTES

¶11[1] See Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959).

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