¶1concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶2I concur with those parts of the per curiam opinion that reverse those portions *359of the judgment ordering the parties to sell certain personal property to pay off marital debts and refusing to award the wife periodic alimony.
¶3However, I would also reverse that portion of the judgment ordering the parties to sell the marital residence, farm land, farm equipment, heavy machinery, and cattle to pay off marital debts because I believe that that, too, is an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. This is not the same as a situation where the marital residence is sold so that the proceeds of the sale can be divided between the parties. The parties should be given the opportunity to work out a way to settle their debts on their own without the trial court’s ordering them to sell their farm.
¶4Therefore, I dissent to that portion of the opinion affirming the part of the judgment ordering the parties to sell the marital residence and farm.
¶5concurring in part and dissenting in part.
¶6I concur with all the holdings of the per curiam opinion, except its order that the trial court upon remand award the wife periodic alimony. I would order the trial court on remand only to reserve the issue of periodic alimony so as to allow the wife in the future to petition the trial court for an award of periodic alimony based upon a change in circumstances. See Dodd v. Dodd, 669 So.2d 915 (Ala.Civ.App.1995); Duckett v. Duckett, 669 So.2d 195 (Ala.Civ.App.1995); Pilgrim v. Pilgrim, 596 So.2d 942 (Ala.Civ.App.1992); Grimsley v. Grimsley, 545 So.2d 75 (Ala.Civ.App.1989).
¶7ROBERTSON, P.J., concurs.