Beathard v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1989
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 61 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 67 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2015 · most notably Herrera v. Collins (1993), Harris v. State (1989)
2 federal appellate · 61 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Chapman v. State of California · Estelle v. Smith · Scharffe v. Perkins · Almanza v. State · Satterwhite v. Texas
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 67 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Normally, because this is an instance of charging error with timely objection, we would apply the “some harm” test set out in Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); c.f. Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). However, the Supreme Court has stated, “The application of a state harmless-error rule is, of course, a state question where it involves only errors of state procedure or state law.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 826 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). When an error implicates rights flowing from the United States Constitution, we must apply the harmless-error rule enunciated by the Supreme Court. Id. Before a “federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. at 828 . This is the same standard imposed by our general harmless-error rule. Tex.R.App. Pro. 81(b)(2).””
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Belyeu v. State“The right to a “no-adverse-inference” instruction is rooted in a jury’s natural tendency to assume that the decision not to testify stems from a defendant having something to hide. See generally Carter v. Kentucky, supra. In the instant case, this was not a concern. By testifying during guilt/innocence, the jury heard numerous things from the appellant. In addition, the state presented no evidence at the punishment phase. Thus, appellant was not placed in a position where the jury would expect him to counter factual assertions made by the state.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Edwards“In Carter v. Kentucky, supra, the Supreme Court expressly reserved the question of whether this type of error can be harmless. Carter, supra [450 U.S.] at 304, 101 S.Ct. at 1121 . To the extent that we believe that the error in this case could not have contributed to the jury’s answer to the special issues, we must necessarily find that this is not a right which is “so basic to a fair trial that [its] infraction can never be treated as harmless_” Chapman [v. California] 386 U.S. at 28 , 87 S.Ct. at 827-28 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Castaneda v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.