Neaves v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

30 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Article 6705, Sec. 2(f) ... requires a finding ... “that probable cause existed that [a suspect] was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle ... while intoxicated[.]” ... We construe this provision to require proof, therefore, that facts within the knowledge of the arresting officer at the time he requests the specimen be such as to justify a reasonable belief that the accused was driving while intoxicated such as to constitute probable cause. Unlike the question whether the suspect was, in point of fact, driving while intoxicated, the question whether “probable cause existed” to believe that he was depends upon the legal significance of facts known to the officer at the time of arrest. A jury finding at trial that an accused was driving while intoxicated can “be had ... without contradicting the former determination” that police had not had probable cause at the time of his arrest to believe that he was. Thus, while evidentiary facts relevant to proving probable cause may also be used later to establish that he had in fact been driving, and intoxicated, the “issue[s] of ultimate fact” are, nevertheless, different. To illustrate this point it is useful to examine what evidence would be relevant to proving the respective “issues of ultimate fact.” Because the probable cause determination is made on the basis only of information available at the time of arrest, facts coming to light after that arrest going to establish guilt of the accused would not be relevant”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte Ayers

2. “fact in the defendant's criminal prosecution for driving while intoxicated, analysis of the specific questions raised by the parties was pretermitted). Any suggestion in Groves and Neaves that collateral estoppel principles would apply in cases like this was pure dicta and unnecessary to our ultimate disposition of those cases. Our opinion does not conflict with the”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Brabson

3. “... We can think of no other explanation for this [probable cause] requirement but that the legislature believed it would be untenable to penalize a D.W.I. suspect who refuses to submit a specimen under circumstances that could not constitutionally justify his arrest for that offense.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Brabson