Stanovsek v. Holder’s Empirical Analysis
768 F.3d 515 · 2014
Citation profile
3 federal appellate ·
Relationships
Applies 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (§ 101 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (§ 201 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (§ 212 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (§ 237 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (§ 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter)) · 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (§ 316 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))
Relies on Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. · Carr v. United States · Martinez v. Mukasey · Hanif v. Attorney General of United States · 134 S. Ct. 2191 - Scialabba v. Cuellar De Osorio
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“If the term “admitted” in the phrase “previously been admitted” included post-entry adjustment of status to an LPR, as proposed by the government, the first section of the statutory language, “an alien who has previously been admitted to the United States as,” would be superfluous because the definition of “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” encompasses adjustment of status.... Had Congress intended the bar on eligibility to apply to all LPRs, it would have simply omitted this phrase. Furthermore, construing the statute to bar from eligibility only LPRs who entered into the United States in such status is bolstered by the longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“We recognize that the BIA’s interpretation of the Act would avoid a reading that appears to make little sense. Why would Congress distinguish between those who obtained lawful permanent resident status at the time of lawful entry and those who adjusted status later, for purposes of barring permanent residents who have committed aggravated felonies from discretionary hardship relief? Our inability to answer such a question does not, however, warrant expanding the scope of a statutory provision beyond a meaning as plainly limited as the one in question here. Absent a constitutional argument (none is made here), we must apply the clear meaning of the Act.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.