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← 769 F.2d 1274 - Seglin v. Esau

Seglin v. Esau’s Empirical Analysis

769 F.2d 1274 · 1985

Citation profile

47
cited by 47 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
2
states following
December 2006
most recently cited

23 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 47 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 2006 · most notably Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas (1991), Doe ex rel. Doe v. St. Joseph's Hospital of Fort Wayne (1986)

23 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

260198519902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1 (§ 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act)

Relies on Conley v. Gibson · Bell v. Hood · Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. · Hagans v. Lavine · Rideout v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[P]laintiffs are required to be more specific as to the facts of the interstate commerce nexus before [the Court] will compel defendants to engage in protract ed, expensive antitrust discovery. Failure to [dismiss] the instant complaint on the ground of lack of any allegations regarding a plausible nexus with interstate commerce would mean that virtually every physician who is ever temporarily denied hospital privileges for whatever reason could drag the hospital and members of its staff into costly antitrust litigation merely by alleging that the defendant receives payments, goods, or equipment in interstate commerce.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “[T]o survive a motion to dismiss, the “plaintiff must allege sufficient facts concerning the alleged violation and its likely effect on interstate commerce to support an inference that the defendants’ activities infected by illegality either have had or can reasonably be expected to have a not insubstantial effect on commerce.””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. ““Under Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 , 78 S.Ct. 99 , 2 L.Ed 2nd 80 (1957), and Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 , 82 S.Ct. 486 , 491 7 L.Ed 458 (1962), ‘a complaint ... must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.’ (citations omitted) In practice, this means that a plaintiff cannot survive a rule 12(b)(6) motion merely by alleging bare legal conclusions while failing to set forth facts that ‘at least outline or adumbrate’ a violation of the Sherman Act. Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir.1984), quoting Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Companies, Inc., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984).” 769 F.2d at 1279 .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.