Taylor v. Heckler’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 federal appellate · 3 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “42 U.S.C. § 423 (g) authorizes interim benefits to individuals appealing the termination of their disability benefits on account of an official determination that they are no longer disabled. S.Rep. No. 648, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4373, 4377-78; H.Conf.Rep. No. 985, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, 4399, 4400. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (g)(1)(a) provides that the section applies “(1) in any case where (a) an individual is a recipient of disability insurance benefits.... ” Taylor is not a recipient of benefits whose benefits are being terminated due to cessation of her disability. In fact the entire purpose of these proceedings is to establish Taylor’s period of disabil ity so she may eventually become a “recipient.” 12 U.S.C. § U23(g) does not authorize an award of interim benefits to Taylor. Taylor relies on Day v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 19 (2d Cir.1982), for her claim that the district court’s award was authorized under the court’s general remedial power. In Day the Second Circuit upheld a district court’s order that the state agency issue reconsideration determinations within 90 days of requests for reconsideration of initial denial of benefits, and that ALJs provide hearings within 90 days after request is made for a reconsideration hearing. The district court had also ordered payment of interim benefits to any claimant who did not receive a reconsideration determination within 180 days of ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 122 F. Supp. 2d 1001 - Hoffman v. Apfel

2. “(1) In any case where— (A) an individual is a recipient of disability insurance benefits ..., (B) the physical or mental impairment on the basis of which such benefits are payable is found to have ceased, not to have existed, or to no longer be disabling, and as a consequence such individual is determined not to be entitled to such benefits, and (C) a timely request for a hearing ... is pending with respect to the determination that he is not so entitled, such individual may elect ... to have the payment of such benefits ... continued for an additional period beginning with the first month beginning ... after January 12, 1983, for which (under such determination) such benefits are no longer otherwise payable, and ending with the earlier of (i) the month preceding the month in which a decision is made after such a hearing (ii) the month preceding the month in which no such request for a hearing or an administrative review is pending, or (iii) June, 1989.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 711 F. Supp. 162 - Saltares v. Bowen

3. “[i]n light of the unmistakable intention of Congress, it would be an unwarranted judicial intrusion into this pervasively regulated area for federal courts to issue injunctions imposing deadlines with respect to future disability claims.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Doughty v. Bowen