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← 77 F.3d 1348 - United States v. Rivera

United States v. Rivera’s Empirical Analysis

77 F.3d 1348 · 1996

Citation profile

37
cited by 37 later decisions
4
states following
April 2025
most recently cited

16 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 37 later decisions — most recently April 2025 · most notably State v. Hedge (2010), United States v. Conley (2002)

16 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions

1901996200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act)

Relies on Bonner v. City of Prichard · Turner v. United States · Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch · Richardson v. United States · Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause “applies only if there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy.” Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 , 325, 104 S.Ct. 3081 , 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) (citations omitted). Appellant has been found “not guilty” as to one of the dates charged. The jury’s finding that the defendant was “not guilty” of the “charge” of possessing the shotgun on February 5, 1995, was merely a finding that the Government had not demonstrated possession on this date beyond a reasonable doubt. This does not, however, constitute an acquittal of the charged possession as a whole because proof of possession on February 5, 1995, is not necessary to support a conviction for the charged offense. When the jury deadlocked as to the August 12, 1994, date, and the district court declared a mistrial, jeopardy did not fully terminate. Therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a second prosecution as to the alleged August 12, 1994, possession. See id. at 325-26 , 104 S.Ct. 3081 (declaration of mistrial following hung jury does not terminate the original jeopardy).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “would result in a multiplicitous indictment, creating the risk of multiple convictions and punishments for a single offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.