Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

55 federal appellate · 58 district · 5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 227 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[W]hen a male employee seeks to prove that he has been sexually harassed by a person of the same sex, he carries the burden of proving that the harassment was directed against him “because of’ his sex. The principle way in which this burden may be met is with proof that the harasser acted out of sexual attraction to the employee. [Cjonduet directed toward an employee of the same gender as the harasser can have sexual content or innuendo and, indeed, may be offensive. But unless such conduct is directed toward an employee “because of’ his or her status as a man or woman, it does not implicate Title VIL I reject the notion that when a man ... uses sexually-oriented gestures and language, or engages in sexually perverse activity to harass another man, Title VII automatically imposes liability.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Fredette v. BVP Management Associates · Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Belleville

2. “(b) Recognizing Sexual Harassment — A finding of sexual harassment does not depend on the existence of any one given set of facts. Sexual harassment can occur in a wide variety of circumstances and encompass many variables. Although the most widely recognized fact pattern is that in which a male supervisor sexually harasses a female employee, this form of harassment is not the only one recognized by the EEOC. The Commission’s view of sexual harassment includes, but is not limited to, the following considerations: (3) The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex from the harasser. Since sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination, the crucial inquiry is whether the harasser treats a member or members of one sex differently from members of the other sex. The victim and the harasser may be of the same sex where, for instance, the sexual harassment is based on the victim’s sex (not on the victim’s sexual preference) and the harasser does not treat employees of the opposite sex the same way.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc. · 107 F.3d -1141 - Yeary v. Goodwill Industries-Knoxville, Inc.

3. “In the context of Title VII's legislative history, ... it is apparent that Congress did not intend such sweeping regulation [to allow same-sex claims]. The suggestion that Title VII was intended to regulate everything sexual in the workplace would undoubtedly have shocked every member of the 88th Congress, even those most vigorously supporting passage of the Act. Detached from their historical setting, the terms of Title VII’s prohibition or discrimination, “because of’ an individual’s “sex,” stand only as “inert language, lifeless words,” and, perhaps, even “playthings with which to reconstruct the Act.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 941 F. Supp. 730 - Schoiber v. Emro Marketing Co. · 943 F. Supp. 952 - Torres v. National Precision Blanking