¶1dissenting.
¶2Because I disagree with the majority’s analysis regarding the admissibility of Mrs. Broadwell’s testimony, and because I believe the testimony was prejudicial, I dissent.
¶3The majority observes that “the prosecutor’s question was directed not to character but to the existence of a mental condition which might cause Vickie to fantasize her account of the incident.” Ante p. 270. On the facts of this case, the distinction between a character trait of lying or fantasizing and a mental condition causing one to lie or fantasize is subtle at best and, perhaps, illusory. In any event, Mrs. Broadwell, as an expert witness, clearly expressed an opinion on the truthfulness of the witness (Vickie).
¶4I believe that the last sentence in Rule 405(a) —“Expert testimony on character or a trait of character is not admissible as circumstantial evidence of behavior” — controls this assignment of error. Rule 405, which delineates the permissible methods of proving character, is identical to Federal Rule 405 except that the last sentence was added by our legislature. Rule 608(a) provides:
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. — The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of reputation or opinion as provided in Rule 405(a), but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence *274may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
¶5The Commentary explains that this Rule is identical to its federal counterpart except for the addition of the language “as provided in Rule 405(a).” The Commentary continues: “The reference to Rule 405(a) is to make it clear that expert testimony on the credibility of a witness is not admissible.” Thus, if Mrs. Broadwell expressed an expert opinion on the credibility of the witness, as I believe she did, her opinion should have been excluded. This case was close, and Mrs. Broadwell’s opinion that “nothing ... indicates that [Vickie] has a record of lying” could have tipped the balance since it prejudicially suggests that the complainant was truthful in her account of the incident with the defendant.
¶6I also cannot subscribe to the view that Rule 412(b)(4) implicitly permits expert psychological or psychiatric opinion as to whether a complainant fantasized the act involved. Rule 412 relates only to the admissibility of evidence of sexual behavior, not of a character for truthfulness, and it was enacted to deal with the special and unique problems presented by the attempt to introduce evidence of the complainant’s past sexual behavior. In the case at bar, neither the question nor the answer involved such evidence. The question asked about the evidence of the complainant’s “mental condition,” and the answer involved her “record of lying.”