Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

77 S.W.3d 137

Blair v. Badenhope

Tennessee Supreme Court

Decided May 3, 2002

Tennessee Supreme Court · decided 2002-05-03

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Based on our prior case law interpreting [a]rticle I, section 8 in this context, and given the overwhelming authority from other jurisdictions on this issue, we conclude that our Constitution does not accord natural parents a presumption of superior rights to modify an existing and valid order of custody, even when that order results from the parent voluntarily agreeing to give custody to the non-parent. Though strong in many respects, no aspect of the fundamental right of parental privacy is absolute, and a parent who is given the opportunity to rely upon the presumption of superior rights in an initial custody determination may not again invoke that doctrine to modify a valid custody order. Absent proof of the custody order’s invalidity or proof that the parental rights were not protected in the initial custody proceeding, the child’s interest in a stable and secure environment is at least as important, and probably more so, than the parent’s interest in having custody of the child returned. Accordingly, we hold that a natural parent is not generally entitled to invoke the doctrine of superior rights to modify a valid custody order awarding custody to a non-parent. Instead, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances — for instance, the natural parent was not afforded an opportunity to assert superior parental rights in the initial custody proceeding; the custody order is invalid on its face; the order is the result of fraud or procedural illegality; or the order grants o”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Neal Lovlace v. Timothy Kevin Copley

“[A] natural parent cannot generally invoke the doctrine of superior parental rights to modify a valid order of custody, even when that order resulted from the parent’s voluntary consent to give custody to the nonparent. Instead, a natural parent seeking to modify a custody order that grants custody to a nonparent must show that a material change of circumstances has occurred, which makes a change in custody in the child’s best interest.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Tracie F. v. Francisco D.

Relies on State v. Wilkerson · Harris v. Chern · State v. Anderson

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2002-05-03

How this case has been cited

Cited by 59 later decisions — most recently May 2025 · most notably In Re Adoption of A.M.H. (2007), In Re Audrey S. (2005)

59 state decisions

400200220102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

FRANK F. DROWOTA, III, C.J.,

¶1concurring and dissenting.

¶2I fully agree with the majority’s conclusion that a natural parent cannot generally invoke the doctrine of superior parental *159rights to modify a valid order of custody, even when that order resulted from the natural parent’s voluntary relinquishment of custody to the non-parent. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that, in such circumstances, a natural parent seeking to modify custody must show that a material change in circumstances has occurred, which makes a change in custody in the child’s best interests. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that Blair has failed to show a material change of cii'cumstances in this case. The factors in the record supporting this conclusion are succinctly summarized in Justice Birch’s dissenting opinion as follows:

When Blair originally agreed to surrender custody of Joy to Badenhope, his relationship with his daughter was uncertain and had only begun. Indeed, he apparently did not even see Joy until after her mother’s death. But in the many years that have passed since that time, Blah’ has expended great effort to create a strong, loving bond with his daughter. That bond has flourished to such a degree that Joy now has expressed an interest in living with Blair. Additionally, Blair has moved to Tennessee to be nearer to Joy,[footnote omitted] and he has purchased a new home in a neighborhood where Joy has many friends. Blair’s relationship with his daughter, his daughter’s interest in living with him, and even his place of residence have changed entirely.

¶3Having concluded that the record establishes a material change in circumstances, I would remand this case to the trial court to determine whether or not transferring custody to Blair is in the child’s bests interests. In my view, a remand is appropriate to give the trial comí the opportunity to make this fact intensive determination using the proper legal standard. Remanding to allow the trial court to apply the correct legal standard also is consistent with this Court’s prior practice in cases which have adopted or refined legal standards that govern fact-specific inquiries. See, e.g., Memphis Housing Authority v. Thompson, 38 S.W.3d 504, 505 (Tenn.2001); Harris v. Chern, 33 S.W.3d 741, 742 (2000); Logan v. Winstead, 23 S.W.3d 297, 303 (Tenn.2000); State v. Anderson, 937 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tenn.1996); State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 939 (Tenn.1995). Consequently, I would remand this case and allow the trial court to determine whether or not custody should be transferred to Blair.

/77/sw3d/137 · .json · Public domain