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77 Tex. Crim. 221

178 S.W 337

Gray v. State

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Decided April 28, 1915

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · decided 1915-04-28

<p>1. —Abortion—Indictment—Statutes Construed—Common Law.</p> <p>That clause of article 1071, Penal Code, defining the offense of abortion which was added to the article by the Act of 1907, defining what is meant by the term “abortion,” was not intended to restrict the definition of abortion, but to add to it instead, and to prevent the common law construction of that term which formerly existed, and where the indictment followed the statute in all particulars, except the inclusion of said latter clause of said article, the same is sufficient.</p> <p>2. —Same—Indictment—Statutes Construed.</p> <p>Where the indictment for abortion, tested by articles 451, 453, 460, 461 and 474 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was sufficient, there was no error in overruling the motion to quash the same, because it failed to allege the latter clause of article 1071, Penal Code, towit, that by reason of the means applied to the person upon whom the abortion was performed, the life of the fetus or embryo in the womb was destroyed, or that a premature birth from the womb was caused.</p> <p>3. —Same—Rule Stated—Indictment.</p> <p>As a rule it is never necessary in the indictment to allege the offense by-defining the meaning of the several words in the statute, although prescribed by the statute itself.</p> <p>4. —Same—Sufficiency of the Evidence—Pregnancy—Circumstantial Evidence.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of abortion, the evidence, although circumstantial, was sufficient to sustain the conviction, and showed that the person upon whom the abortion was committed was pregnant at the time the defendant committed the various acts which constituted the offense of abortion, and the court gave a proper charge on circumstantial evidence requiring the jury to find the prosecutrix was pregnant at the time, there was no' reversible error on that ground.</p> <p>5. —Same—Evidence—Other Offenses—Intent.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of abortion, there was no evidence offered or introduced which tended to prove other than that the acts which defendant performed were with the intention of producing an abortion, if the prosecutrix was pregnant, testimony which tended to show and from which the jury were authorized to believe that the defendant produced abortions on other women, both before and after the acts committed by defendant upon the prosecutrix .in the instant case, was inadmissible and reversible error, as the issue that there might be no guilty intent was not involved. Hollowing Bowman v. State, 70 Texas Crim. Rep., 22, and other eases. Prendergast, Presiding Judge, dissenting.</p> <p>6. —Same—Accomplice—Charge of Court.</p> <p>The woman upon whom an abortion is committed is not an accomplice, and the evidence did not show that another State’s witness was an accomplice, and there was therefore no error in the court’s failure to charge, upon accomplice testimony. Following Fondren v. State, 74 Texas Crim. Rep., 552.</p> <p>7. —Same—Cross-examination—Charge of Court.</p> <p>Where upon trial of abortion the defendant on cross-examination of a State’s witness sought to show ill-feeling and hostility to defendant, and brought out the fact that defendant was not desired in the community, not because she was a negro, but because she was a character, there was no error in the court’s refusal to charge the jury not to consider the testimony to the effect that defendant was a professional abortionist.</p> <p>8. —Same—Bill of Exceptions.</p> <p>Where the bill of exceptions was insufficient to require this court to pass upon the question as to hearsay testimony, the matter could not be reviewed; besides, the matter was withdrawn from the jury.. Following Best v. State, 72 Texas Crim. Rep., 201; Miller v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 609, and other cases.</p> <p>9. —Same—Requested Charge—Objections to Charge of Court.</p> <p>Where, upon trial of abortion, no objections whatever were made to the court’s charge, and no charge was requested submitting the issue of an attempt to produce abortion, there was no reversible error.</p> <p>10. —Same—Evidence—Other Offenses—Intent.</p> <p>Where the only reasonable deduction from the evidence, upon a" trial for abortion, is that it does not raise the issue that the defendant at the time she performed the operation on prosecutrix knew that the latter was not pregnant, and only performed the operation to bring about a flow of the menses, but the evidence showed that the act she performed was done to cause a flow of the menses to bring about an abortion, if prosecutrix was pregnant, and no evidence was introduced which tended to prove other than that the acts which defendant performed were with the intention of producing an abortion, if the prosecutrix was pregnant, testimony that defendant produced abortions on other women, both before and after the act committed by her on the prosecutrix, was inadmissible and reversible error. Following Harris v. State, 55 Texas Crim. Rep., 469, and other cases. Prendergast, Presiding Judge, dissenting.</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1915-04-28

How this case has been cited

Cited by 20 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 2000

17 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1Before the original opinion was written I carefully read and thoroughly studied the evidence and record. I then reached the conclusion that appellant's contention in the trial court was, that she not only did not know that Mrs. Moore was pregnant when she performed the acts she did upon her, but also "that the acts she performed upon her were solely and simply for the innocent purpose and intention of bringing on the suppressed menses of Mrs. Moore and under the belief that she was not pregnant."

¶2In considering the motions for rehearing, I have again more carefully read and thoroughly studied the evidence and record, if that can be, than when I wrote the original opinion, and I am confirmed and strengthened in my original opinion. My brethren, however, have reached the other conclusion. If they are right, of course the judgment should be reversed.

¶3I do not propose to give any detailed statement of the evidence, — only sufficient of it to show how I reached the conclusion I did and why I adhere to it.

¶4Mrs. Sadie Moore was the State's first witness. The substance of her testimony on direct examination was that on March 12, 1913, she had been married about three months. "It had been just a short while since my menstrual period, — about two weeks I reckon." That she knew appellant and went to her home and saw her there said date; that Mrs. Rob Moore (another Mrs. Moore) went out there with her. "I told her (appellant) what I wanted done; I told her I wanted an abortion. . . . She asked me how far I was and I told her about two weeks or ten days or something like that. There was something said about pay, — defendant said she charged $10 and I paid her. I then lay down on a couch and defendant used a catheter, a little rubber tube, and she inserted it into my womb. She put some cotton around the catheter. She left it in there. . . . The catheter remained inserted in my womb from about 11 o'clock one day until about 11 o'clock the next day, then I removed both the catheter and the cotton. . . . After the removal of the catheter and cotton I was sick; it was successful — my menstrual period I guess came from the womb after the removal of the catheter and cotton. There was also something else came from my womb, but not very much of anything — it looked like a little *234 old white substance, just very small, about the size of a dime. After this about two or three weeks I consulted with a physician — Dr. Nance; he came to my house and made an examination of my womb and put an ice bag on my side. I just wanted to have the doctor come and see me and tell him what I had done; I just kind of felt kind of bad and I thought there might be some inflammation there or something."

¶5Appellant then took her on cross-examination and had her testify that she was nineteen years of age when she married and never had been married before; that she had never given birth to a child, was ignorant of all such matters when she went to see appellant and had never before been pregnant and knew very little about matters of that kind. "My regular menstrual period should have arrived along some time about the first of March and my period not arriving about that time, I became uneasy as to my condition. There was nothing in my condition that aroused my apprehension except the fact that I had missed my monthly period and I was not accustomed to missing it." That she first discussed her condition with said Mrs. Rob Moore, who was an older and longer married woman than she was, and told her about missing her menstrual period and the time; that Mrs. Rob Moore told her she could go out to appellant, and she went there mainly to see what her condition was, and told appellant the time she had missed her menses and that "I was worried about my menstruation, and asked her if she could do anything to cause the resumption of my menstruation or cause me to `come 'round.' . . . She asked me how long I had passed my period and I told her all I knew about my condition was that I had missed my period. She told me that she would not make an examination of me or try to bring on my menstruation unless my husband requested her to do it." She said that she then phoned to her husband and he told her he would leave it with her; that defendant did not send for her but she voluntarily went to get the help of defendant to relieve her of the situation that was embarrassing her. "When I talked to defendant about this and after we had called up my husband, it seems to me she said something about my waiting until the next month to see if my period would not come around without doing anything." That she was very nervous and crying at the time and told defendant that if she was going to have it done she would rather have it done then. She further said that after the catheter was inserted in her womb and her womb packed with cotton and after it remained there about twenty-four hours it "produced the flow — more than usual." Appellant further had her testify: "At the time I went out to see defendant I thought I was pregnant but I did not know; I do not suppose that I could swear that I was; that I was absolutely certain about the matter. but I thought so then and still think I was."

¶6On redirect examination she testified that she was living with her husband since she married him and that the ordinary relations between man and wife existed between them, and during the time within forty days preceding the time she discovered that her menstruation had ceased had had sexual intercourse with her husband. *235

¶7On recross-examination appellant had her testify that she phoned Mrs. Rob Moore the day before March 12th and told her she thought she was pregnant. She said, "Mrs. Moore might have told me in this phone conversation that it was not unusual for a lady to go by her menstrual period," but she did not remember that she did; didn't remember telling her that she didn't know whether she was pregnant or not.

¶8The next State's witness was said Mrs. Rob Moore. On direct examination she said that on said occasion, March 12, 1913, she went with Mrs. Sadie Moore to appellant's house and heard the conversation between appellant and Mrs. Sadie Moore; that Mrs. Sadie Moore wanted Mrs. Gray to examine her and she refused, and Mrs. Sadie Moore began to cry and beg her to, and Mrs. Gray said she would if Mrs. Moore would phone her husband; Mrs. Moore phoned her husband, and he was perfectly willing to go ahead, and then Mrs. Gray said she would. The horse hitched to the buggy in which these two ladies went to appellant's got loose and Mrs. Rob Moore said she went to catch the horse and did not see what appellant did to Mrs. Sadie Moore; that when she returned from catching the horse everything was over and Mrs. Sadie Moore was ready to go; that she knew that Mrs. Sadie Moore took some money with her, and thinks she paid defendant $10; that she thought Mrs. Sadie Moore was going to be sick and went over to Mrs. Sadie Moore's the next day to help her get dinner, found that she was up and just as cheerful as she had ever seen her.

¶9On cross-examination appellant had Mrs. Rob Moore to tell that the day before, March 12th, Mrs. Sadie Moore told her she had passed her period some eight or nine days and that she asked her, the witness, to go out with her to appellant's to find out whether she was pregnant or not. She said, "I do not remember whether she just said it in that way or not, but she wanted to be examined. Mrs. Moore talked to me like she thought she was pregnant, and I tried to convince her that she was not, but she thought she was because she was so young and inexperienced; she just said she had passed her time eight or nine days and that was the only reason she thought she was pregnant. I explained to her that missing her period was nothing uncommon." That when she went over the next day to help Mrs. Sadie Moore with her dinner, she said: "It seems she said something to me about having menstruated but she said nothing about having aborted or delivered a child. . . . Just stated that her menstruation had come around all right and that she was all right; she never told me that there was anything unusual about the menstruation coming around or any unusual discharges." These two witnesses were the only ones other than appellant herself by whom the State could prove its case as to the immediate facts thereof.

¶10I think the examination by the State and the direct testimony of both of these witnesses was for the sole purpose of showing that Mrs. Sadie Moore was pregnant and that the acts performed upon her by appellant were performed with the knowledge of that fact and with *236 no other intention than to produce an abortion. On the other hand, I think the cross-examination of both of these witnesses was not only for the purpose of attempting to show that Mrs. Moore was not pregnant, but especially to show that if she was, that she, appellant, did not know or believe it, for she had Mrs. Moore to testify that she herself, Mrs. Moore, did not know, but simply believed or thought she was pregnant, and had the other Mrs. Moore to testify that she tried to convince Mrs. Sadie Moore that she was not pregnant, but simply that her menses was suppressed for a few days, which was not an unusual, but simply an ordinary condition of married women. And that appellant performed the act she did, not to produce an abortion, but simply and solely for the innocent purpose and intention of bringing on her suppressed menses. From the course of the whole cross-examination of these two witnesses to my mind, it is the same as if the appellant had said to the trial court and jury: "I did not know that Mrs. Sadie Moore was pregnant, — I did not believe she was. What I did to her was with no intention or purpose to bring on an abortion, but was simply and solely to relieve the lady of her distress and bring on her suppressed menses; that her menses were not suppressed because of pregnancy but from some other cause, which was not unusual in women." This being the case, I believe the testimony of the other witnesses showing and tending to show that she had produced abortions on other women, both before and after, was clearly admissible.

¶11I think there can be no doubt, not only that appellant made this contention and showed it both directly and by implication from her cross-examination of these witnesses, but that she could make it appear more or less plausible, for there can be no doubt and is none, to my mind, that if Mrs. Moore had not been pregnant that what appellant did to her would unquestionably have brought on her suppressed menses whatever the cause other than pregnancy. In other words, here was a woman with delayed or suppressed menses. What appellant did to her would bring on her suppressed menses, whether caused by pregnancy or some other cause. Then unquestionably what appellant did was an equivocal act. The State contended that the act was performed to bring on an abortion and with that intent only; the appellant contended that that was not true, but that what she did was done for the purpose of bringing on suppressed or delayed menses and with that intent and for that purpose only. To bring on her menses if not pregnant was not a crime but a commendable and innocent act. Hence, the application of the rule that testimony of her like acts upon other women showing that her intention was to bring on an abortion and not innocently bring on suppressed menses, was clearly admissible.

¶12I think the judgment should be affirmed, — not reversed. *237

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