Volume 77 — United States Reports

it appeared from the opinion of the District Court, from which it had been taken to the court, below was this: About 4 o’clock on the morning of- the 24th of August, 1867, the British ship Blackwall, then at anchor in the harbor of San -Francisco, was discovered to be on fire. Shortly afterwards the alarm was communicated to the shore, and the fire department of the city called out.

Held: by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, that it could not be enforced because the United States could not be sued in a personal action, and their possession could not be disturbed by a suit in *19 rem.

Louise Rains brought trespass, November 26th, 1866, in one of the State courts of Louisiana against McKee (who was marshal of the United States), Cady, and others, sureties of McKee in his official bond.

JJrror to the Circuit Court-for the Northern District of Illinois, the ease being thus-: , .

Held: that an indorsement on the policy by the assured, “ Payable, in case of loss, to E. C. Bates ” (the plaintiff), and under this, the indorsement by the insurer that “ Consent is hereby given to the above indorsement-,” did not imply either a knowledge or consent to the sale of the goods insured. 2.

Held: in the case of the Bank of Augusta v. Earle, † that franchises are special privileges conferred by the government on.individuals, and which do not belong to the citizens of the country generally of common right; and that in this country no franchise can-be held, which is not derived from the law of the State. ‡ Contracts undoubtedly may be made by such -municipali-: ties to the extent of the authority conferred for…

Golding, a citizen of Louisiana, brought suit against Milne & Co., of Mississippi, to recover a certain sum due for machinery furnished the last-named parties.

* But the 96th section of the same act exempted from the tax goods manufactured of materials on which duties had ^een paid, unless the increased value of such goods exceeded five per cent, ad valorem.† These provisions of the statute being in force, Boylan, a manufacturer of clothing, on the 10th of May, 1864, eutered into a contract with the United States to manufacture and deliver to it at times specified, a certain amount of army clothing, for which he was to receive a…

An act of Congress, “fixing the compensation of public ministers and-of consuls residing on the coast of Barbary, and for other purposes,” passed on the 1st of May, 1810,* provides that the President shall not allow “ to any consul, who shall be appointed to reside at Algiers, a greater sum than at the rate of $4000 per annum as a compensation for all his pei-sonal services and expenses.” Provision is. made by the same act for salaries to consuls at Tangiers, Tripoli, and…

Held: therefore, that this question is concluded by the former decree • but willing to allow this defendant the benefit of any defence consistent with the rules which govern proceedings in equity, we have looked into the question as if it were still open. Having thus looked into it, we'find no sufficient-ground for altering the conclusion embodied in the decree.

Louis, as is known, is situated on the west . side of the Mississippi Eiver. and faces the stream. It was 'formed by the'French and Spanish in times as early 'as 1764; and passed to the sovereignty of the United States by the cession which France made December 20, 1803,- of the large region then known as the province of Louisiana.

- ■ Woodman sued Stimpson, in the court below, to recover damages for an infringement of a patent granted on the 29th March, 1864, for “ a new and useful machine for ornamenting leather,” as stated in the letters patent. In the specification the plaintiff stated that he has “invented a new and useful improvement in boarding or pebbling leather,” and describes how this process was formerly carried on.

The State of Texas filed a bill, February 15,1867, against White, Chiles, and several others, to recover possession of some one hundred and eighty-five United States “Texas Indemnity Bonds” for $1000 each, charged to have been illegally obtained by them. Chiles having, been served, put in his answer on May 25th, 1867, in which he accounted specifically for some fifty-one of the bonds.

<p>1. An account rendered, and not objected to within a reasonable time, is to be regarded as admitted by the party charged, to be primCt facie correct.</p> <p>2. If certain items in an account under such circumstances are objected to • within a reasonable time, and others not, the latter are to be regarded as covered by such an admission.</p> <p>3. What is to be regarded as a reasonable time is, when the facts are clear, . a matter of law. Where the proofs are conflicting, it is a mixed one of law and fact; and in such eases the court should instruct the jury upon the several hypotheses of fact insisted on by the parties.</p> <p>. 4. Between merchants at home, an account presented, and remaining unobjected to, after the lapse of several posts, is treated, under ordinary circumstances, as being, by acquiescence, a stated account.</p> <p>5. But the court will not take notice judicially of the time which rail-cars require to run between different places, and of the frequency of the mails between them.</p> <p>6. Where the bill of exceptions does not purport to sot out all the evidence given in a case below, and it does not appear what other evidence, if any, was there given, a court of error will not reverse for-an instruction whose correctness or want of it depends upon the state of the evidence ; the terms of the instruction not necessarily implying that ther.e were not facts in proof bearing upon the subject besides those of which the instruction was expressly predicated; and error not being matter to be presumed, but contrariwise.</p>

On certificate of division- between the judges of the-Circuit Court for the Northern District of Ohio, the case being this: The Patent Act of July 4th, 1836, “ to promote the progress of the useful arts,” authoi’ized the patenting of any “ new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter,” and gives an exclusive right to the patentee for a term of fourteen years,, with a privilege of renewal for seven in certain cases, but this act did- not allow a patent…

Held: that though the letter was never acknowledged, it was a question which should have been submitted to the jury, 'whether this long delay to sell in view of a market falling the whole time, was in the exercise of sound discretion, good faith, and reasonable diligence ; and that an instruction that the consignor should boar all losses sustained after his refusal to answer the factors’ letter without excepting such…

In error.to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the case being this: Millard, a captain in the military service of the United States, was, in 1865, on’leaving the service, a creditor of the government for $859, arrears of pay as captain.

In May, 1.861, he transferred his entire stock to one Pepper, secretary of the company, to enable him (Pepper) to make some disposition of it in view of approaching hostilities.

Held: that the ordinance, so far as it operated upon the business of the defendants, was not in conflict with that clause of the Constitution which declares that “Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States;” nor with the clause which declares that “ the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States; ”…

Held: that when carriers discover themselvesjn peril by inevitable accident, the law requires of them ordinary care, skill, and foresight, which it defines to be the common prudence which men of business and heads of families usually exhibit in matters-that are interesting to them. ■ In Denny v. New York Central Railroad Co., * the defendants were guilty of a negligent delay of six days in transporting wool from…

This was a suit in admiralty to enforce a lien claimed upon the steamer Lulu for repairs made upon her at the request of the master. It ifras consolidated with other suits, all brought by material men for supplies or repairs to the vessel to the extent of $8796.21. The steam vessel was owned in New York, which was her home port, but employed in the trade between Baltimore, in Maryland, and Charleston, in South Carolina.

any tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, until appeal shall have been duly made to the Commissioner of Internal Bevenue, according to the provisions of law in that regard, and the regulations of tho Secretary of the Treasury established in pursuance thereof, and a decision of said commissioner.shall be had.thereon, unless such suit shall bo brought within six months from the time of said decision, or within six months from the time this…

Held: that a party settiug up a grant by such proofs, must also show that there was a judicial survey of the laud, and that the supposed grantees took actual possession of it, and exercised acts of ownership over it, before the change of jurisdiction.

■ Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York. The owners of the propeller Jersey Blue libelled the steamship Columbia, one of the Charleston line of steamers, in the District Court for the Southern District of that State, on account of a collision which occurred in the harbor of New York, on the afternoon of the 7th of January, A.D. 1860.

Latham and Denting being entitled, each of them, to recover a certain sum of money from the United States for work done prior to the act of February 25th, 1862, known as the first of the. “Legal Tender Acts,” appealed, after the passage of the acts, to the Treasury for payment. They demanded coin, but were offered and accepted paper; “protesting,” when receiving the paper, against such mode of payment.

Held: that this was sufficiently formaI( and that it Was a final judgment to which a writ of error would lie. On motion to dismiss writ of error.

Error .to the Circuit Court for the District of Maryland.* Eliza Deery brought ejectment October 12, 1863, in the court just mentioned, to recover from one Cray an undivided fifth part of .the southern half of Kent Fort Manor, an ancient manor in Kent .County, Maryland. This manor was an irregularly shaped piece of land', whose longest direction is- mainly north and south, surrounded entirely by water except on the northern line, which crosses a rather narrow neck of land.

Held: the writ of error sued out in the case operated as a supersedeas.

<p>Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in a case of a bill by the Washington, Alexandria, and Georgetown Railroad Company, against the City of Washington, and J. H. and A. T. Bradley and others, amended by the addition of new defendants; and of a petition “ by way of cross-bill,” made by one of the respondents in the case,referring to the case by title, and stating that “ the facts'fully appear in the case,” praying the reverse of what the complainant had prayed, but not making anybody defendant, nor praying process, and under which no process was obtained; the decree appealed from having been a decree in accordance with the prayer of this “ cross-bill.” The particulars of the case, which was argued here by Messrs. Bartley, Bradley, and ’Davidge, for the appellants; and by Messrs. Brent, Orittenden, and Durant, contra, are perhaps sufficiently indicated by</p>

Appeals from the Supreme Court of tlie District of Columbia; the case, as clearly proved, or admitted by the parties, being thus: Ou the 1st of May, 1845, Gunnell on one side and Bird and Hepburn on the other, entered into copartnership in the lumber business as equal partners, entitled to an equal share of the profits.

<p>Error to the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of ' Tennessee, the case being thus :</p> <p>The code of Tennessee of 1857-8, under its chapter on attachments, thus provides:</p> <p>§3455. Any person having a debt or demand due at'the commencement of an action ; or a plaintiff after action for any cause has been brought, and either before or after judgment, may ‘ sue out an attachment at law or in equity against the property of a debtor or defendant in the following cases:</p> <p>2. Where he is about to remove or has removed himself from the State.</p> <p>5. Where he absconds or is absconding or concealing himself or property.</p> <p>§ 3462. Attachments sued out in aid of a suit already brought ■ shall be made returnable to the court or justice before whom the suit is pending.</p> <p>§ 3469. In order to obtain an attachment the plaintiff, his agent or attorney, shall make oath in writing, stating the nature and amount of the debt or demand, and that it is a just claim, and also that one or more of the causes enumerated in section 3455 exists.</p> <p>3470. It is no objection to the attachment that the bill, affidavit, or attachment states, in the alternative or otherwise, more than one of the causes for which an attachment may be sued out.</p> <p>§3471. The officer to whom application is made shall, before granting the attachment, require the plaintiff ... to execute a bond in double the amount claimed to be due, . . . payable to the defendant and conditioned that the plaintiff will prosecute the attachment with effect, or in case of failure pay, &e. § 3472. The affidavit and bond shall be filed by the officer taking them in the court to which the attachment is returnable, and shall constitute a part of the record in the case.</p> <p>Subsequent sections of the chapter provide for publication for a fixed time in a newspaper published in the county where the suit is brought of a memorandum or notice of the attachment, and declare:</p> <p>§ 3522. This memorandum or notice shall contain the names of the parties, the style of the court to which the attachment is made returnable, the cause, alleged for suing it out, and the time and place at which the defendant is required to appear and defend the attachment suit.</p> <p>§ 3524. The attachment and publication are in lieu of personal service upon the defendant, and the plaintiff may proceed-upon the return of the attachment duly levied, as if the suit ' had been commenced by summons.</p> <p>With these enactments of the code in force, W. Gr. Brown-low, on the 26th September, 1863, sued out a writ of summons in trespass, in the County Court of Knox County, Tennessee, against Reynolds and others, for false imprisonment, for ejecting him from the State, &e.; damages $25,000. To this writ the sheriff returned that “he had made search and that none of the defendants were to be found in his county,” On the same day that he applied for the summons, and before the same person, one M. L. Hall, who, as clerk, had issued the summons in the trespass suit, Bi’ownlow filed an affidavit, for an attachment against the property of Reynolds and the others. . The affidavit, after .giving the names of the pax’ties to the summons, x’an thus:"</p> <p>“ The plaintiff makes oath that he has a good cause of action against the defendants'herein named in which he will be entitled to recover a very large sum. He further swears that all of defendants have fled from this State or that they so abscond or conceal themselves that the ordinary process of law cannot reach them ; that he has this day instituted an action of trespass against them claiming $25,000. Plaintiff therefore prays for an ancillary attachment against their property in aid of this his suit.” •</p> <p>An attachment bond being given in double the amount ($50,000) the attachment issued; the bond and attachment being, like the affidavit and summons had been, both dated September 26th. The attachment recited the above-given affidavit substantially as made, and directed the sheriff to. attach so much of the property of Reynolds and the others as should be sufficient to satisfy the said amount of $25,000, and such estate so to secure that the same might be subject to further proceedings thereon at a court to be held on a day subsequent and specified. The sheriff returned to this last writ that he had attached all the right and title of Reynolds in and. to one hundred, and sixty acres of land in Knox County. Publication was ordered by the court to be made in the Knoxville Whig (a paper of the county), notifying to the defendants to appear and plead, answer or demur, or that the suit would be taken as confessed and proceeded in ex parle as to them. The record did not, however, set forth the notice which was published, if any was; though it did set forth the order for publication, which was entitled, “.Order of publication, and the publication as made in the Knoxville Whig making it appear, perhaps, that the omission to set forth the notice was a clerical error.</p> <p>The record of Brownlow’s suit went on to say that the defendant, Reynolds, and the others being solemnly called to come into court, came not, but made default, and it appearing — ‘the record proceeded — that the attachment had been duly levied on the-defendant’s property, and that publication had been made according to laio, it was ordered that the plaintiff should recover his damages. These were assessed at $25,000, and for this sum execution was ordered to 'issue, and that the sheriff"should sell the one hundred'and sixty acres of land attached. The land was accordingly sold under a venditioni exponas, and a, deed made" by the sheriff to one Cooper, by.orider of the purchaser. Cooper was put into possession by a writ of haberi facias, issued from the same court in the same proceeding. Being thus in possession, Reynolds, the original owner, brought ejectmentin the court below against him. Cooper asserted title under the judicial proceedings above described.. It was admitted that Reynolds had title to the land’ unless it had beén divested by those proceedings. The record of the proceedings having been obtained from the Knox County Court, and put in evidence below, the defendant asked the court to instruct the j ury:</p> <p>“That the Court of Knox County had jurisdiction of attachment cases and actions of trespass, and that as it is declared in the .judgment in the suit of Brownloio v. Reynolds et al. that the attachment was duly levied on the property of the defendants, and that publication had been made according to law, this adjudication was conclusive upon parties and privies, until the same should be reversed by a court of error; that the sheriff’s deed to the defendant made, by virtue of the sale under and by virtue of the judgment of the Court of Knox County, communicated a good title to the pi*eihises in Controversy to the defendant as against the plaintiff, and that the regularity of the proceedings in the said suit of Brownlow v. Reynolds et al. could not be collaterally inquired into in this cause.”'</p> <p>This instruction the court refused to give, but charged the jury:. ...</p> <p>“ That the summons issued in the case of Brownlow v. Reynolds et al. was not served upon the plaintiff in this suit, and that.the question was whether the attachment would bring him into court; that the affidavit upon which the attachment was issued, was not made in conformity to the attachment laws of Teunessee; that it did not show the court in which suit was brought, or state' specifically the cause of action or nature thereof, as required under the decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, so as to connect itself with' the summons in the action of trespass; that it did not appear that any publication was in fact made, and that the Court of Knox County acquired no jurisdiction of the cause; that the attachment and proceedings thereon were not sufficient to bring ^Reynolds before the court; that there was no authority for rendering the judgment, and that the levy of the attachment, the judgment of the court, the sale by the sheriff, and the sheriff’s deed, were null ap’d void, and conveyed no title.”</p> <p>Verdict and judgment having gone accordingly for the plaintiff', the question now here, on error by the other side, was whether this instruction -was correct. ■</p>

Error-to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, the case being thus,: By treaty of June 3d, 1825,* the United States concluded a treaty with the Kansas Indians, containing mutual cession's of territory.

The Judiciary Act of 1789* gives the Circuit Courts jurisdiction where the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another State; and enacts that no civil suit shall be brought in them against an inhabitant of the United States by original process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in’ which he may be found at the time of serving the writ.

Clark libelled the steamer Farragut for causing the destruction of the canal-boat Ajax and her cargo on the 8th of March, 1866. The Buckeye Mutual Insurance Company having paid Clark $1500 insurance on the canal-boat, came in by petition, and were made parties libellant, and subrogated to Clark’s rights in the cause to the amount thus paid.

These were appeals from the Circuit Court for the District of Vermont, in two decrees, one of them on a bill filed by the Rutland Marble Company against a certain Ripley and one Barnes, and the other one a cross-bill filed by the same Ripley again'st the company just named.

This was an action of trespass, according to the local practice of Texas, to try the title to several leagues of land, in Falls County, in that State.' On the trial of the case before a jury the plaintiff proved title in one Pedro Zarsa to the lands in controversy, and gave in evidence a letter of attorney, executed in 1831, from Zarsa to McKinney, authorizing him to sell the lands or to substitute another person in his stead for that purpose.

Held: after the grantee’s death, that the agreement did not prevent the grantor’s bringing suit for the infringement of the patent without naming the grantee. Error to the Circuit Court for Maryland, the case being thus: *368 The Patent Act of 1836 * thus enacts: “Section. 11.

, wool brokers in Boston, to sell, with instructions not to sell unless the purchaser came to Boston and examined the wool for himself. These brokers sent to E. N. Kellogg & Co., merchants and dealers in wool, in Hartford, Connecticut, at their request, samples of the different lots of wool, and communicated the prices at which each lot could be obtained.

And the 53d section of the statute enacts “That any person required by law to be licensed as a distiller shall, in addition to what is required by other provisions of law, make an application therefor to the assessor of the district, and before the same is issued, the person so applying shall give bond to the United States in such sum as shall be required by the collector, with one or more sureties to be approved by said collector, ‘ conditioned'— in effect— “(1.) That if he…

Upon ail this being done, and $5 paid for filing and examining the .statement, and. $1 for the certificate, a license authorizing the agent applying for it “ to transact the business of insurance in this State,” is then allowed to be granted from year to year!

Howard and others filed in the court below a bill of peace and for conveyance of pretended title to a tract of land described, against 8. A. Maverick and J. H. Herndon, and on that bill the court decreed that the complainant “ have and recover of the said 8.

On motion. Atkins had libelled the steam tug Mabey in the District Court at New York, for injury doné by the Mabey to a vessel of his, then in New York harbor. The District Court decreed in his favor, and the Circuit Court affirmed the decree. The owner of the Mabey appealed to this court; and Mr. T. M. Wheeler, in his behalf, now moved the court for a commission to take further evidence to be read in this court on the hearing.

A statute of July 13th, 1866,* enacts, that any person who shall accept, negotiate, or pay, or cause to be accepted., negotiated, or paid, any promissory-note, without the same being duly stamped, or having an adhesive stamp for denoting the tax chargeable thereon, and cancelled, &c., “with intent to evade the provisions of the act,” shall forfeit $50, and that such instrument or note “ not being stamped according to law, shall be deemed invalid and of n,o effect.” A mode is…

This was a motion-to dismiss an appeal taken on the part of the United States from the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico. The suit was brought by Vigil and others to recover a parcel of land in that Territory, under a special act of Congress, passed 21st June, 1860, which gave the right of appeal to either party, if asked for within one year from-the rendition of the judgment.

. Tappan was the proprietor of what is now generally known as a “ Mercantile Agency,” the purpose of which is to collect information of the standing, character, and credit of merchants all over the country, and to communicate such' infoi’mation for reward to the business houses who may need it in their dealings with the former. And it was a communication made by Tappan to one of his customers concerning the plaintiffs, Beardsley & Co., that constituted the alleged libel.

” Another act of the same day, ameudatbry of an act of 1846, allows the importer to make such addition in the entry to the cost or value of the imports, given in the invoice, as in his opinion may raise the same to the true 'market value in the country whence exported.

Gray filed a bill in equity in the court below against thé Chicago, Iowa, and Nebraska Railroad Company, to enjoin them from building a railroad bridge across the Mississippi River, at the town of Clinton, situate on its banks on the Iowa or western side, and extending to a point opposite on the eastern or Illinois side. Railroads in each State came to the termini of the bridge.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia; the .case being thus: The seventh section of the-act of June 7th, 1862, for the collection of direct taxes in insurrectionary districts, after directing the advertisement and sale of lands, upon which taxes due the United States remained unpaid, after a time specified, enacts*— By a first clause, that the owner of the land, or any loyal person of the United States having any interest in it, may at any time, within sixty days after the…

On a certificate of division in opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, The case was thus: Woodruff made and delivered, to Hannauer, at Memphis, Tennessee, on the 22d of December, 1861, a promissory note, dated that day, for $3099, with interest.

These were two motions on George "W. Paschal, an attorney and counsellor of'this court, and as such lately repre-. senting the State of Texas in suits which it had here. The first motion being in the case of that State against White, Chiles and others (No. 4 on the original docket), already largely reported; the second, in the case of the same complainant against Peabody & Co. (No. 6 on that same docket), not yet in any way adjudged.

In the year 1856, Shepardson, who was the owner of a lot in Milwaukee fronting on the Menomonee and Milwaukee Rivers in the said city, and who had begun to build a wharf at the junction of those rivers, conveyed the interest that he had in the wharf and in the front of the lot to the centre of the Milwaukee River, to one Yates, with tlie right and privilege of docking, dredging out, and making a water front on the Milwaukee River.

Held: in Lawler v. Walker and others * that the statement in a certificate of the State court that there was drawn in question the validity of statutes of 'Ohio, without saying what statutes, was too indefinite, and that the statutés complained of in the case should have been specified.

ment of certain county bonds issued to railroads in June and July, 1858, and where the fact whether, at the time the bonds were issued, the then constitution of.the State gave authority to counties to issue such bonds, was one of the issues raised by the pleadings, enjoined the collection; so apparently, in effect, deciding that the bonds were void under the constitution of the State existing when they were issued. The creditors,appealed to the Supreme Court of the State.

The act continues : “ The finding of the court upon the facts, which finding shall be general or special, shall have the same effect as the verdict of'a jury. The rulings of the court in the progress of the trial when excepted to at the time, may be reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error or upon appeal, provided the rulings be duly presented -by a bill of exceptions.

Held: that the possession of the whole body of land, as described in the deed, must be presumed to have been taken by the mortgagee in right of the mortgage. 4. An irregular judicial sale made at the suit of a mortgagee, even though no bar to the equity of redemption, passes to the'purchaser at such sale all the rights of the mortgagee as such. 5.

On motion to dismiss a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The case was this: Bethel brought suit against Demaret and others in a dis> trict court of! the State, to enforce a mortgage given to secure' the payment of two notes of §7500 each, given by them for the loan of Confederate currency, on the 2d April, 1862, payable in two and three years after date, with interest.

<p>Proceedings to confiscate real estate under the act of July 17th, 1862, entitled “ An act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels,” &c., are not “ proceedings in admiralty,” although the act declares that they shall heinrem, and conform as near as may be to proceedings in admiralty or in revenue eases.” .</p> <p>Accordingly, no writ of prohibition from this court to a District Court lies in the case of such proceedings; the writ being confined by the Judiciar'y Act to cases where the District Courts are proceeding as courts of admiralty.</p>

Held: that the city did not, under the arrangement between it and the railroad company, stand in the position of a surety in such way as that the company was bound to prevent its being prejudiced by events not anticipatediwhen the arrangement between the parties was entered into. 2.

On motion to dismiss an original writ: The first clause of the second section of the third article of the Constitution ordains that the judicial power shall extend to certain cases named, and among them “ to controversies between a State and the citizens of another State.” The second clause of this same section provides: “ That in all cases affecting ambassadors, &e., and those in which a State shall be a party, th.e Supreme Court shall Lavé' original jurisdiction,” and that…

The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870), was a United States Supreme Court case concerning whether a given body of water was navigable. The Court's majority opinion, written by Justice Stephen J. Field, held that bodies of water that are "navigable in fact" are considered navigable for legal purposes. This holding contradicted existing British common law, which had defined navigability based on the ebb and flow of the tides.

Held: to be corporations. The association does not make out of its members a new artificial political person; it still remains a body of natural persons, with certain privileges conferred upon them. No new body is created by the legislature with the property of individuality, and the capacity of holding property and transaeting'business.

. The capture, which was the subject of this libel, took place on the 10(A day of May, 1865, in North Carolina, at the mouth of Quauk'cy Creek, on the Boanoke Biver, about half a mile below Halifax, and about 180 miles above Plymouth, which lies at the mouth of the river, where the river falls into Albemarle Sound; the river at that point being narrow and shallow.

Pitzer Miller brought suit in the 'court just named against Larkin McKenzie, James Hamer, Joseph Hamer, and Eze- • kiel Wall, to recover the value of several bales of cotton. Such proceedings were had that a judgment was rendered for the defendants, whereupon the plaintiff brought this writ of error: the writ reciting that the proceedings were between “ Peter Miller, Larkin McKenzie, and others.”

Error, to the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. This was an action of covenant upon an administration bond, brought by the ordinary of Morgan County, Georgia, for the use of persons claiming to be distributees of the estate of Alfred Eubanks, deceased, against the administrator, who was the principal obligor, and against his sureties in the bond.

Held: the' company never revoked it until they removed Stagg in 1864; that the agency was not revoked by the circular of 1849. Mr. J. M. Krum, contra.

f dollars to prosecute the war, resolved to borrow it on what were called loan-office certificates, and to establish a loan office in each State for the convenience of the lenders of money. The resolution directed the appointment by the authority of the State of a commissioner of loans, whose duty it was to receive the certificates from the Treasurer of the United States, and to deliver them for such sums of money as he should be able to borrow.

Held: say the court in that case, that if there was what is called a scintilla of evidence in support of a case the judge was bound to leave it to the jury, but that' a course of recent decisions has established a more reasonablé fule, to wit, that in every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is or may be a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there…

Held: that a subscription of stock and issue of county bonds, authorized upon a vote of the people of the county to the original corporation, could not be legally made to one of the three new corporations. 2.