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← 77 U.S. 218 - Braun v. Sauerwein

Braun v. Sauerwein’s Empirical Analysis

77 U.S. 218 · 1869

Citation profile

110
cited by 110 later decisions
10
cited 10 times by the Supreme Court
16
states following
September 2016
most recently cited

21 federal appellate · 8 district · 33 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 110 later decisions (10 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2016 · most notably Georgia v. Rachel (1966), American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith (1990)

21 federal appellate · 8 district · 33 state decisions — followed in 16 states

1301869187018801890190019101920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Hopkirk v. Bell · Hodgson v. Millward

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 110 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““They all rest on the ground that the creditor has been disabled to sue, by a superior power, without any default of his own, and therefore that none of the reasons which induce the enactment of the statutes apply to his case; that, unless the statutes cease to run during the continuance of the supervening disability, lie is deprived of a portion of the time within which the law contemplated he might sue.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““It is, undoubtedly, a general principle, that when a statute of limitation has begun to run, a -disability to sue subsequently intervening does not stop its running, even though the disability be one of those expressly recognized, in the statute itself. * * * But in Hanger v. Abbott, 6 Wall. 532 , 18 L.Ed. 939 , it was ruled, after grave consideration, that the time during which the courts of the recently rebellious states were closed to the citizens of other states, is, in suits brought by such citizens, to be excluded from the computation of the time fixed by statutes of limitation, within which only suits may be brought, and this, though the statutes contain no such exemption. In other words, it was held that the statutes of limitations of the insurrectionary states were suspended, while the courts in those states were closed by the war. Similar decisions have been made in the state courts. They all rest on the ground that the creditor has been disabled to sue, by a superior power, without any default of his own and, therefore, that none of the reasons which intiuced the enactment of the statutes apply to his case; that unless the statutes cease to run during the continuance of the supervening disability, he is deprived of a portion of the time within which the law contemplated he might sue.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.