Schepp v. Hess

¶1concurring specially:

¶2Courts of general common-law jurisdiction have control of all judgments, decrees, or other orders, however conclusive in their character, during the term in which they are rendered; and they may set aside, vacate and modify them during such term in the exercise of wide and extended discretion. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Avery, 205 Okl. 274, 237 P.2d 433 (1951). This inherent equitable power of courts over their orders and judgments during the term at which they are rendered arises independently of statutory authority. Williams v. Long Bell Lumber Co., 203 Okl. 250, 219 P.2d 992 (1950); Selected Investments Corporation v. Bell, 201 Okl. 408, 206 P.2d 989 (1949). The import of its codification at 12 O.S.1981 § 1031.1 is not to abrogate, but rather to retain a trial court’s inherent control over its own judgments, decrees, or other orders for a period immediately following rendition. Only the applicable period in which a trial court may exercise its control, not its inherent power to act, is effected by the legislative substitution of a period of thirty (30) days after rendition, in lieu of the old vacation in “term time” rule. The statutory codification thus states:

§ 1031.1 Authorization to correct, open, modify or vacate judgments — Time —Notice

Within thirty (30) days after the rendition of a judgment, the court, of its own initiative or on motion of a party, may correct, open, modify or vacate the judgment. The court may prescribe what notice, if any, shall be given.

¶3[Emphasis added.]

¶4The inherent common-law power of trial courts over their orders and judgments for a period immediately following rendition thereof is not statutorily impaired by § 1031.1. A trial court’s power to vacate its own judgments, decrees or other orders remains unfettered when exercised within thirty (30) days following rendition thereof. Our decisions under the old “term time” rule are expressly applicable to the provisions of § 1031.1. Orthopedic Clinic v. Jennings, 481 P.2d 139 (Okl.1971). Moreover, the exercise of the trial court’s inherent power under § 1031.1, is neither dependent on, nor precluded by, either an application for new trial available under 12 O.S.1981 § 651; or, purely statutorily created grounds enumerated at 12 O.S.1981 § 1031 which provide avenues for vacation during and beyond the thirty day period in addition to that codified at § 1031.1. As determined by this Court in Crider v. First Interstate Bank of California,1to the extent that Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 581 P.2d 31 (Okl.1978) may be interpreted to the contrary, it is overruled. Inasmuch as a trial court exercising its authority, as expressed by § 1031.1, may do so “of its own initiative, or on motion ... ”, the determination whether to vacate or not is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court for a period of thirty days immediately following final disposition by judgment, decree or order and will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of a showing of clear abuse of discretion.