Wickham v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) The conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annu[l]ment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure, and (2) The procedure under which the same was granted or issued required a substantial showing of rehabilitation or was based on innocence. This provision is very similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 609(c). Federal cases applying this rule to prior convictions under various state statutes seem to turn on whether the state’s set-aside procedures require an affirmative finding that the defendant has been rehabilitated. See, e.g., United States v. Pagan, 721 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir.1983); Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1244 (11th Cir.), rehearing denied, 764 F.2d 1411 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Potts, 528 F.2d 883, 885 (9th Cir.1975) (en banc). Alaska’s set-aside statute, AS 12.55.-085, does not expressly require a finding of rehabilitation. Under AS 12.55.085(d), a person who has been given a suspended imposition of sentence must be discharged without the imposition of a sentence when that person successfully completes the period of probation specified in the original sentencing order. Under AS 12.55.085(e), upon discharge, “the court may set aside the conviction and issue to the person a certificate to that effect.” While it is obvious that the statutory provisions governing suspended impositions of sentence and set-asides are gen erally calculated to promote the rehabilitation of deserving offenders, it is uncertain whether a set-aside order ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Wickham v. State

2. “The present case poses few of the uncertainties discussed in Luce and Page . Wickham’s counsel made it clear that Wickham’s decision to testify would depend on the court’s ruling on the eviden-tiary issue. Wickham’s counsel also made a reasonably detailed offer of proof as to Wickham’s proposed testimony. Under the circumstances, the trial court had adequate information to enable it to balance the probative value of the impeachment evidence against its potential for prejudice to Wickham’s case. The record leaves little room for doubt that the state would have introduced evidence of Wickham’s perjury convictions had he testified. The trial court indicated that the convictions would be admissible to impeach Wickham, regardless of the substance of his testimony. We conclude that Wickham did not forfeit his right to appeal the admissibility of his perjury convictions by electing not to testify at trial.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Wickham

3. “(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, (1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and (2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Kirkwood