770 So. 2d 1221 - State v. Gaines’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) The state may appeal from: (a) An order dismissing an indictment or information or any count thereof or dismissing an affidavit charging the commission of a criminal offense, the violation of probation, the violation of community control, or the violation of any supervised correctional release. (b) An order granting a new trial. (c) An order arresting judgment. (d) A ruling on a question of law when the defendant is convicted and appeals from the judgment. Once the state's cross-appeal is instituted, the appellate court shall review and rule upon the question raised by the state regardless of the disposition of the defendant's appeal. (e) The sentence, on the ground that it is illegal. (f) A judgment discharging a prisoner on habeas corpus. (g) An order adjudicating a defendant insane under the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. (h) All other pretrial orders, except that it may not take more than one appeal under this subsection in any case. (i) A sentence imposed below the lowest permissible sentence established by the Criminal Punishment Code under chapter 921. (j) A ruling granting a motion for judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict. (k) An order denying restitution under s. 775.089. ( l ) An order or ruling suppressing evidence or evidence in limine at trial. (m) An order withholding adjudication of guilt in violation of s. 775.08435. (2) An appeal under this section must embody all assignments of error in each pretrial order that the state seeks to have reviewe”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 891 So. 2d 525 - Exposito v. State

2. “Double jeopardy is generally no bar to a subsequent prosecution when a mistrial was granted in the original trial upon the defendant’s motion. [Citations omitted]. In Oregon v. Kennedy, [ 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2088 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982)], the. United States Supreme Court held that there is a narrow exception to this rule where it can be shown that the prosecution’s “conduct giving rise to the successful motion for a mistrial was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial.” 456 U.S. at 679 , 102 S.Ct. at 2091 .... [T]he Court explained that prosecutorial conduct that might be viewed as harassment or overreaching sufficient to justify a mistrial, is insufficient to bar a retrial absent such an intent. Id. at 675-76 , 102 S.Ct. at 2089-90 . “Only where the governmental conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion.” Id. at 676 , 102 S.Ct. at 2089 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Worsham v. State

3. “If the trial court exercises its discretion to consider the motion to suppress during trial, the court may withhold ruling on the merits of the motion, and motion for a judgment of acquittal, and allow the case to be submitted to the jury. If the defendant is acquitted, no further proceedings regarding the motion to suppress or motion for a judgment of acquittal would be necessary. However, if the jury finds the defendant guilty of the crime charged, the trial court could then consider the motion to suppress post-trial in conjunction with the defendant’s renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal or motion for new trial.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 837 So. 2d 924 - Amendments to the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure