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← 771 F.2d 312 - Illinois Department of Revenue v. Phillips

Illinois Department of Revenue v. Phillips’s Empirical Analysis

771 F.2d 312 · 1985

Citation profile

117
cited by 117 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
December 2012
most recently cited

50 federal appellate · 7 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 117 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 2012 · most notably Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York (2010), Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan (1986)

50 federal appellate · 7 district ·

8801985199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 15 (§ 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914) · 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (§ 901 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (§ 901 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (§ 901 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act)

Relies on Sedima Sprl v. Imrex Company Inc · United States v. Turkette · Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. · State of Georgia v. Pennsylvania R Co · American National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago v. Haroco Inc

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 117 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[a] pattern of racketeering activity ... requires at least two acts of racketeering activity within a ten year period.... Because the statute defines 'racketeering activity' to include mail fraud, the defendants' mailing of nine fraudulent tax returns to the Illinois Department of Revenue over a nine month period constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Although we have doubts about the application of RICO to the facts of this case we cannot say that it does not come within the framework of the statute. Defendant Phillips admits the same and attempts to tease out of the legislative history the principle that RICO cannot apply to a state department of revenue’s attempt to punish tax cheats. The history, however, is in fact silent on this point. Principles of comity might suggest that the federal courts are not the proper place to pursue state tax collection claims, but the Supreme Court and this circuit have emphasized that the importation of state claims into federal court is inherent in RICO’s purpose. ****** We can only hope that this decision appears to Congress as the distress flag that it is, and that Congress will act to limit, as only it is empowered to do, the statute’s application to cases such as the one before us now.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The defendant’s mailing of nine fraudulent tax returns to the Illinois Department of Revenue over a nine-month period constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity as defined in the statute.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.