Latta v. Otter’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 federal appellate · 12 district · 7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 56 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Unsupported legislative conclusions as to whether particular policies will have societal effects of the sort at issue in this case — determinations which often, as here, implicate constitutional rights— have not been afforded deference by the Court. To the contrary, we “retain an independent constitutional duty to review factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake.... ” [T]here is no empirical support for the idea that legalizing same-sex marriage would harm— or indeed affect — opposite sex marriages or relationships. 97”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Soltysik v. Padilla · 56 F. Supp. 3d 1056 - Hamby v. Parnell

2. “Historically, marriage was a profoundly unequal institution, one that imposed distinctly different rights and obligations on men and women. The law of coverture, for example, deemed the “the husband and wife ... one person,” such that “the very being or legal existence of the woman [was] suspended ... or at least [was] incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband” during the marriage. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 441 (3d rev. ed.1884). Under the principles of coverture, “a married woman [was] incapable, without her husband’s consent, of making contracts ... binding on her or him.” Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 , 141 [ 16 Wall. 130 , 21 L.Ed. 442 ] (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). She could not sue or be sued without her husband’s consent. See, e.g., Nancy F. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation 11-12 (2000). Married women also could not serve as the legal guardians of their children. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 , 685 [ 93 S.Ct. 1764 , 36 L.Ed.2d 583 ] (1973) (plurality op.). Marriage laws further dictated economically disparate roles for husband and wife. In many respects, the marital contract was primarily understood as an' economic arrangement between spouses, whether or not the couple had or would have children. “Coverture expressed the legal essence of marriage as reciprocal: a husband was bound to support his wife, and in exchange she gave over her property and labor.” Cott, Public Vows, at 54. That”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. DeBoer v. Snyder

3. “Idaho[’s] ... marriage laws, by preventing same-sex couples from marrying and refusing to recognize same-sex marriages celebrated . elsewhere, impose profound legal, financial, social and psychic harms on numerous citizens of those states. These harms.are not inflicted on opposite-sex couples, who may, if they wish, enjoy the rights and assume the responsibilities of marriage. Laws that treat people differently based on sexual orientation are unconstitutional unless a “legitimate purpose ... overcome[s]” the injury inflicted by the law on lesbians and gays and their families . Because defendants have failed to demonstrate that these laws further any legitimate purpose, they unjustifiably discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, and are in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 172 F. Supp. 3d 1118 - Knapp v. City of Coeur D'Alene