Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 771 So. 2d 1014 - Keith v. Moone

771 So. 2d 1014 - Keith v. Moone’s Empirical Analysis

1997

Citation profile

6
cited by 6 later decisions
1
states following
May 2018
most recently cited

6 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 6 later decisions — most recently May 2018

6 state decisions

40199720002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Ex Parte Dowling · Sweeney v. Tritsch · Coosa Marble Co., Inc. v. Whetstone · Maddox v. Hunt · 676 So. 2d 344 - Conway v. HOUSING AUTH. OF BIRMINGHAM

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"Resolving questions of abuse of discretion requires an understanding of the extent of discretionary authority with which a trial judge is vested. By its plain language, Rule 55(c) confers broad discretionary authority upon trial judges. This discretion, however, is not boundless. Rule 1(c), Ala.R.Civ.P., states: `These rules shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' Thus, Rule 1 mandates that trial courts construe Rule 55(c) to effectuate an expeditious, efficient, and just resolution of litigation. This requires a trial court to balance two competing policy interests associated with default judgments: 1) the need to promote judicial economy and 2) the need to preserve an individual's right to defend on the merits. See C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil, § 2693 (2d ed.1983). Application of the default judgment rule can easily lead to a polarization of these two objectives. Denying a motion to set aside a default judgment would further the goal of securing a `speedy' and `inexpensive' resolution of the action, yet would potentially deprive a litigant of an opportunity to present a viable defense. Conversely, granting a motion to set aside a default judgment would advance the cause of individual justice by insuring an adjudication on the merits, but would, in view of the concurrent delay and additional costs, impair the objective of promoting judicial efficiency. Reconciling these two opposi”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “A default judgment that reserves the assessment of damages is interlocutory and may be set aside at any time; once the trial court assesses damages on the default judgment, the judgment becomes final. Rule 55(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Maddox v. Hunt, 281 Ala. 335 , 202 So.2d 543 (1967).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “[i]n the usual case, after a post-judgment motion has been denied, the only review of that denial is by appeal; a judge has no jurisdiction to `reconsider' the denial.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.