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← 772 F.2d 1314 - United States v. DiCaro

United States v. DiCaro’s Empirical Analysis

772 F.2d 1314 · 1985

Citation profile

74
cited by 74 later decisions
9
states following
September 2020
most recently cited

42 federal appellate · 3 district · 14 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 74 later decisions — most recently September 2020 · most notably 128 Ill. 2d 66 - People v. Flores (1989), 135 Ill. 2d 252 - People v. Redd (1990)

42 federal appellate · 3 district · 14 state decisions

33019851990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (§ 901 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 2

Relies on Ohio v. Roberts · Pointer v. Texas · California v. Green · Dutton v. Evans · United States v. Powell

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 74 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if— (1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition....”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Based on our analysis of both the statutory language and the underlying policies of section 1962(c), we held in Haroco that an individual corporation could not be held liable as a “person” that conducted its own affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity under that section. Id. We began by noting that the terms “person” and “enterprise” are both defined in section 1961 of RICO to include “any corporation,” id., just as both are defined to include “any individual.” Nevertheless, section 1962(e) provides that the person who is charged with conducting the enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity must also be “employed by or associated with” the enterprise. Id. Thus, if we construed section 1962(c) to permit the same entity to be both the person and the enterprise, we would reach the anomalous result that the entity was employed by or associated with itself. After considering the language of section 1962(c), we therefore concluded that Congress did not intend to allow the same entity to be both the person and the enterprise under section 1962(c). Id. * >}: >}: * sfc * We recently reaffirmed this interpretation of section 1962(c) in McCullough v. Suter, 757 F.2d 142 (7th Cir.1985). In McCullough , we held that the defendant-proprietor of a sole proprietorship could be held liable under section 1962(e) on the theory that he conducted the affairs of the proprietorship through a pattern of racketeering activity. Id. at 143 . We emphasized, however”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “As we parse' subsection (a), a “person” (such as a corporation-enterprise) acts unlawfully if it receives income derived directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person has participated as a principal within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2 , and if the person uses the income in the establishment or operation of an enterprise affecting commerce. Subsection (a) does not contain any of the language in subsection (c) which suggests that the liable person and the enterprise must be sepa rate. Under subsection (a), therefore, the liable person may be a corporation using the proceeds of a pattern of racketeering activity in its operations. This approach to subsection (a) thus makes the corporation-enterprise liable under RICO when the corporation is actually the direct or indirect beneficiary of the pattern of racketeering activity, but not when it is merely the victim, prize, or passive instrument of racketeering.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.