Diggs v. Hood’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

18 federal appellate · 12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[ijndemnity is due when fairness requires that one person bear the total responsibility for an injury. The basis for indemnity in the civil law, as in the common law, is restitution, the indemnitor having been unjustly enriched when the person seeking indemnity has discharged liability that was his responsibility. A solidary debtor who pays a debt that “concern[s] only” a co-debtor is, | therefore, entitled to indemnity from the debtor in whose behalf the debt arose. Thus a person who is held liable vicariously or passively for the tort of another is due indemnity from the culpable tortfeasor. One who is himself at fault, however, is not due indemnity because liability for indemnity exists only when the party seeking indemnity, the indemnitee, is free of fault and has discharged a debt that should be paid wholly by the indemnitor. The Louisiana Supreme Court has summed up the principle this way: indemnity shifts the entire loss from a tortfeasor only technically or constructively at fault to the person primarily responsible, while contribution apportions the loss among those jointly responsible.”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 581 So. 2d 714 - Illinois Cent. Gulf R. v. Deaton, Inc. · 684 F. Supp. 1373 - Brister v. Gulf Central Pipeline Co.

2. “Under the earlier [Louisiana] rule, joint tortfeasors were each liable for their virile, that is per capita, share of the debt, but Civil Code article 2103 now provides, '[i]f the obligation arises from an offense or quasi-offense [a tort] it shall be divided in proportion to each debtor's fault.'”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 528 So. 2d 716 - CAJUN ELEC. POWER CO-OP., INC. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. · Nance v. Gulf Oil Corp.

3. “"Indemnity is due when fairness requires that one person bear the total responsibility for an injury ... one who is himself at fault is not due indemnity because liability for indemnity exists only when the party seeking indemnity, the indemnitee, is free of fault and has discharged a debt that should be paid wholly by indemnitor." However, a crucial fact present in Diggs, supra, but not present in the instant case, was the fact that Ford Motor Company, the alleged tortfeasor-third party defendant, could not, under any circumstances, be considered wholly liable for plaintiffs' injuries. In Diggs, supra, a Ford driven by original plaintiff, Clarence Diggs, was struck from the rear by an eighteen wheeler driven by Billy Hood. As a result of the accident, Diggs was partially paralyzed. Diggs then filed suit against Hood and various other parties connected with Hood. Hood filed suit against Ford Motor Company, seeking contribution and indemnity, and Diggs amended his own suit to add Ford Motor Company as an original defendant. Both Hood and Diggs, in their separate petitions, alleged that various defects in the seat and other parts of the vehicle driven by Diggs aggravated Diggs' injuries. The court specifically held: "The Hood interests are, therefore, not entitled to indemnity from Ford, for neither Diggs nor they contend that Ford is responsible for the collision, which certainly caused at least some of Diggs' injuries. Ford could not, therefore, be solely liable to Diggs. If ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 547 So. 2d 391 - Klumpp v. XYZ Ins. Co.