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← 772 F.3d 388 - DeBoer v. Snyder

DeBoer v. Snyder’s Empirical Analysis

772 F.3d 388 · 2014

Citation profile

31
cited by 31 later decisions
3
cited 3 times by the Supreme Court
4
states following
March 2025
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 6 district · 4 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 1 U.S.C. § 7 · 28 U.S.C. § 453

Relies on Crawford v. Washington · Baker v. Carr · Teague v. Lane · City of Cleburne Texas v. Cleburne Living Center · Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka et al.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 31 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Just two scenarios, then, permit us to ignore a Supreme Court decision, whatever its form: when the Court has overruled the decision by name (if, say, Windsor had directly overruled Baker) or when the Court has overruled the decision by outcome (if, say, Hollingsworth [v. Perry, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 2652 , 186 L.Ed.2d 768 (2013) ] had invalidated the California law without mentioning Baker).”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “the case for constitutionalizing the definition of marriage and for removing the issue from the place it has been since the founding: in the hands of state voters.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “A first requirement of any law, whether under the Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause, is that it' rationally advance a legitimate government policy. Two words (“judicial restraint”) and cine principle (trust in the people that “even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process”) tell ■us all we need to know about the light touch judges - should use in reviewing laws under .the standard. So long as judges can. conceive of some plausible reason for the law — any plausible reason, even-one that did not motivate the legislators who enacted it — the law must stand, no matter how unfair, unjust, or unwise the judges may consider it as citizens. ... The signature feature of rational basis review is that governments will not be placed in the dock for doing too much or for doing too little in addressing a policy question.... [Rjational basis review does not permit courts to invalidate laws every time a new and allegedly better way of addressing a policy emerges, even a better way supported by evidence and ... by judicial factfinding. If legislative choices may rest on “rational speculation unsupported by . evidence or empirical data,” it is hard to see the point of premising a ruling, on unconsti.tutionality on factual findings made-by one unelected federal-judge that favor a different policy.. Rational basis review does not empower federal courts to “subject” legislative .line-drawing to “courtroom” factfinding designed- to show that legisla”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.