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← 772 F. Supp. 2d 511 - Rothstein v. UBS AG

772 F. Supp. 2d 511 - Rothstein v. UBS AG’s Empirical Analysis

2011

Citation profile

8
cited by 8 later decisions
July 2018
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 1 district ·

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act of 2019) · 18 U.S.C. § 2339 (§ 803 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001) · 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (§ 120005 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994) · 50 U.S.C. § 4605 · 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (§ 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (McCarran-Walter))

Relies on Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood · Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co. · Ruotolo v. City of New York · Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project · Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute & Holy Land Foundation

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “As the Second Circuit suggested, there are several obvious and potentially dispositive differences between Humanitarian Law Project and Rothstein. To begin with, Humanitarian Law Project does not address Article III standing, a central component of the Court’s Roth-stein decision. This is especially important as Article III “requires a federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter before it considers the merits of a case.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 , 583, 119 S.Ct. 1563 , 143 L.Ed.2d 760 (1999). Indeed, no statute could cure plaintiffs’ standing deficiencies, as Congress cannot “abrogate the Art. Ill minima.” Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 , 100, 99 S.Ct. 1601 , 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979). Thus, neither 18 U.S.C. § 2339 (B)(a)(l) nor the Supreme Court’s interpretation thereof alters in any way plaintiffs’ obligation to satisfy the “fairly traceable” prong of the standing inquiry, which requires them to plausibly plead that a defendant’s alleged actions “materially increase[d] the probability of injury.” Huddy v. F.C.C., 236 F.3d 720 , 722 (D.C.Cir.2001).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Congressional policy determinations are likely to be quite different with respect to the two entities, as reflected by the fact that 50 U.S.C.App. § 2405(j)(l) permits certain transactions with state sponsors of terrorism as long as a valid license is obtained. It thus appears highly unlikely that the same stringent prohibitions on providing material support to FTOs apply with equal force to state sponsors of terrorism, with whom lawful contact is permitted.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.