772 So. 2d 263 - State v. Nichols’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Our Legislature has imposed distinctions among various criminal offenses relating to payments for referral of clients to attorneys for representation. LSA-R.S. 37:219, the statute at issue in these appeals, makes it a crime for attorneys to pay others for the purpose of obtaining representation of any client. LSA-R.S. 14:356.1 makes it a crime for those providing wrecker services to receive compensation for referring accident victims to attorneys, and LSA-R.S. 14:356.3 makes it a crime for those providing ambulance services to receive compensation for referring accident victims to attorneys. , Similarly, LSA-R.S. 14:356 makes it a crime for law enforcement personnel to procure or solicit legal business for an attorney, with the expectation or promise of being paid. Our judicial duty requires us to recognize these legislatively created distinctions in the law and hold that the Louisiana principal statute, LSA-R.S. 14:24, is inapplicable to the cases now under review. The state’s argument, while creative, is unpersuasive; and we conclude that the trial courts properly granted defendants’ motions to quash in these cases.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Stewart · 811 So. 2d 1054 - State v. Hampton

2. “The Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Celestine, 95-1393 (La.1/26/96), 671 So.2d 896 , addressed the law of principals under LSA-R.S. 14:24 within the context of a narcotics offense. After purchasing cocaine from an undercover officer conducting a “reverse sting” operation, the defendant in Celestine was charged and convicted of distribution of cocaine in violation of LSA-R.S. 40:967(A)(1). Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to quash the distribution charge on the ground that the defendant purchased, but did not distribute the cocaine. The trial court denied the motion, and the ease proceeded to trial. Over defense objection, the trial court gave the jury a principal charge under LSA-R.S. 14:24. Following his conviction on the cocaine distribution charge, the defendant appealed to the First Circuit, which affirmed the conviction and sentence. State v. Celestine, 94-0845 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/5/95) , 655 So.2d 818 . The Louisiana Supreme Court granted the defendant’s application for review to consider whether the defendant-purchaser in Celestine could be convicted as a principal on a cocaine distribution charge. In a per curiam opinion with one concurrence, the supreme court held that the Louisiana principal statute was inapplicable in the case and that the defendant was guilty of cocaine possession, but not distribution. The defendant’s distribution conviction was amended to simple possession of cocaine, his sentence was vacated, and the case was remanded for resentencing. ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 904 So. 2d 805 - State v. Brown

3. “[i]t shall be unlawful for any attorney to pay money or give any other thing of value to any person for the purpose of obtaining representation of any client.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Stewart