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← 774 NW2D 829 - Thompson v. Kaczinski

Thompson v. Kaczinski’s Empirical Analysis

2009

Citation profile

65
cited by 65 later decisions
8
states following
June 2021
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 47 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 65 later decisions — most recently June 2021 · most notably Aw v. Lancaster County School Dist. 0001 (2010), April Goodwin, Tiffany Randolph and Javon Washington v. Yeakle's Sports Bar and Grill, Inc. (2016)

1 federal appellate · 47 state decisions

610200920102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Lindquist v. Des Moines Union Railway Co. · Carolan v. Hill · Gerst v. Marshall · Kelly v. Sinclair Oil Corp. · Sankey v. Richenberger

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 65 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Tort law does not impose liability on an actor for all harm factually caused by the actor’s tortious conduct.” Restatement (Third) ch. 6 Special Note on Proximate Cause, at 574. This concept has traditionally been designated “proximate cause.” While this term is used extensively and appropriately by courts, practitioners, and scholars, it causes considerable confusion for juries because it does not clearly express the idea it is meant to represent. See id. § 29 cmt. b, at 576-77. The confusion arises when jurors understand “proximate cause” as implying “there is but one cause—the cause nearest in time or geography to the plaintiffs harm—and that factual causation bears on the issue of scope of liability.” Id. § 29 cmt. b, at 577. Thus, in an attempt to eliminate unnecessary confusion caused by the traditional vernacular, the drafters of the third Restatement refer to the concept of proximate cause as “scope of liability.” The drafters of the Restatement (Third) explain that the “legal cause” test articulated in the second Restatement included both the “substantial factor” prong and the “rule of law” prong because it was intended to address both factual and proximate cause. Id. ch. 6 Special Note on Proximate Cause, at 574. Although the “substantial factor” requirement has frequently been understood to apply to proximate cause determinations, see Gerst, 549 N.W.2d at 815-16 , the drafters contend it was never intended to do so. Restatement (Third) § 29 cmt. a, at 576. Accordi”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““must initially consider all of the range of harms risked by the defendant’s conduct that the jury could find as the basis for determining [the defendant’s] conduct tortious. Then, the court can compare the plaintiffs harm with the range of harms risked by the defendant to determine whether a reasonable jury might find the former among the latter.””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “An actor's liability is limited to those ... harms that result from the risks that make the actor's conduct tortious.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.