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← 774 SO2D 1215 - Stokes v. Stewart

Stokes v. Stewart’s Empirical Analysis

2000

Citation profile

7
cited by 7 later decisions
1
states following
August 2015
most recently cited

7 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on 549 So. 2d 840 - Rosell v. Esco · 617 So. 2d 880 - Stobart v. State Through DOTD · Cities of Charlottesville v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. · Canter v. Koehring Company · 341 So. 2d 332 - Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The standard for appellate review of general damage awards is difficult to express and is necessarily non-specific, and the requirement of an articulated basis for disturbing such awards gives little guidance as to what articulation suffices to justify modification of a generous or stingy award. Nevertheless, the theme that emerges from Gaspare" v. LeMaire, 245 La. 239 , 158 So.2d 149 (1963) through Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La. 1976), and through Reck to the present case is that the discretion vested in the trier of fact is "great," and even vast, so that an appellate court should rarely disturb an award of general damages. Reasonable persons frequently disagree about the measure of general damages in a particular case. It is only when the award is, in either direction, beyond that which a reasonable trier of fact could assess for the effects of the particular injury to the particular plaintiff under the particular circumstances that the appellate court should increase or reduce the award.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “an owner of an automobile who knowingly entrusts it to an intoxicated, or otherwise incompetent, driver is responsible for the harm resulting from the incompetent operation of the vehicle.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. “the lender of a vehicle is not responsible for the negligence of the borrower, unless he had or should have had knowledge that the borrower was physically or mentally incompetent to drive.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.