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← 774 SW2D 195 - Tompkins v. State

Tompkins v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1987

Citation profile

144
cited by 144 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
7
states following
January 2018
most recently cited

6 federal appellate · 133 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 144 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently January 2018 · most notably Tompkins v. Texas (1989), Cantu v. State (1992)

6 federal appellate · 133 state decisions

10701987199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green · Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine · Batson v. Kentucky · Swain v. State of Alabama

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 144 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““A prima facie case represents the minimum quantum of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact is true. The party with the burden of proof must produce at least this much evidence to avoid a finding that the allegation is not true as a matter of law. Once produced, however, the allegation must be found true unless it is contradicted, impeached, or rebutted by other evidence. ...””
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “In a supplemental brief ... appellant has offered just such a comparison, inviting this Court to employ the record of jury selection that exists in this cause to impeach or rebut testimony given by the prosecutors at the “Batson” hearing.... However, even though the trial judge might have judicially noticed or independently recalled testimony from the jury selection process, there is nothing in the “Batson” hearing to suggest that she was requested by defense counsel to do so. In short, at the “Batson” hearing counsel for appellant gave no indication to the trial judge that he wanted her to consider the credibility of any neutral explanation offered by the State based upon the manner in which similarly-situated white veniremen were treated during voir dire. [[Image here]] Because the trial judge was not urged to make, and did not make, a finding based upon a comparison analysis in deciding the issue whether the prosecutors’ neutral explanations were rebutted or impeached at the “Batson” hearing with evidence that unchallenged white veniremen also possessed the same purportedly undesirable characteristics, we do not consider this circumstance in reviewing the trial judge’s findings in this cause.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “[W]e find that the prosecuting attorney’s reasons that she gave constitute a racially neutral explanation, and it is not the office of this Court to judge her credibility. Explicit in Batson, supra, is that a prosecuting attorney is free to exercise his peremptory strikes, provided that they are non-race related. “The challenge, after all, is still a peremptory one.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.