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775 F.2d 445

Docket No. 84-2054.

United States v. Asselin

First Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued Sept. 12, 1985.

Decided Oct. 25, 1985.

First Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1985-10-25

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“the premises known as a single family trailer . . . with attached carport,”

quoted by 1 later decision, including United States v. Ferreras

Applies 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act)

Relies on Illinois v. Gates · United States v. Leon · Aguilar v. Texas

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1985-10-25

How this case has been cited

Cited by 42 later decisions — most recently January 2012 · most notably United States v. Taylor (1993), United States v. Bonner (1986)

19 federal appellate · 8 district · 11 state decisions

2001985199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*446Stephen P. Nugent, Providence, R.I., for defendant, appellant.

¶2James E. O’Neil, Asst. U.S. Atty., Providence, R.I., with whom Lincoln C. Almond, U.S. Atty., Providence, R.I., was'on brief for appellee.

¶3Before COFFIN, ALDRICH and TOR-RUELLA, Circuit Judges.

¶4BAILEY ALDRICH, Senior Circuit Judge.

¶5Defendant Asselin, who was amply shown to be the resident of a trailer home on Rowland Drive, West Greenwich, Rhode Island, was convicted on a one count indictment of possessing in excess of 12 ounces of a controlled substance, cocaine, with intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On this appeal he challenges the sufficiency of probable cause to issue the warrant under which the cocaine and a large sum of money were seized, as well as asserting that the officers exceeded the warrant’s scope. He further disputes the sufficiency of the evidence. We find no merit in any contention.

¶6Briefly, a qualified attesting special agent stated that a local police officer, long known to the agent as reliable, had told him that an informant, well known to the officer as reliable, and “who has given information in the past which has led to several seizures of narcotics which resulted in convictions [and whose] information has never been found to be false,” had told the officer that he had been inside defendant’s trailer within the week and had seen a large amount of cocaine and a large amount of United States currency therein, and that defendant was a large scale cocaine dealer, who was selling cocaine at the kilogram level. The local police officer further informed the special agent that defendant had a reputation with the police of being a major dealer. Defendant asserts this was “totem pole hearsay.”

¶7So be it. There is no objection to hearsay, if the informant is shown to be reliable and there is a disclosed, reliable, basis for his information. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 80 S.Ct. 725, 735, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). In fact, defendant admits in his brief that “[h]earsay will support a finding of probable cause” if the informant is found to be credible and the basis of his information reliable. In this case, the affidavit included sufficient information to support both of these findings. This included the fact that the informant had been providing information to the police department on a continuing basis, that the information had never been found to be false, and that it had led to several seizures of narcotics in the past. Further, the informant had demonstrated personal, firsthand knowledge of the defendant’s activities in this case and the defendant was previously known to the police department as a major dealer. From these facts, the magistrate could find the informant reliable, and his account first hand and specific. On that basis, probable cause was clear. Cf. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416, 89 S.Ct. 584, 589, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

¶8As to scope, the warrant designated “the premises known as a single family trailer ... with attached carport occupied by Roland Asselin ... including a 1977 Ford LTD color silver located on said property ... [to search for] cocaine, U.S. currency and records____” The officers testified at the suppression hearing that they interpreted *447“premises” as including the surroundings. They, accordingly, included in their search a disabled Cadillac, parked adjacent to the carport, and a birdhouse hanging from a tree about 15' from the trailer steps. The birdhouse attracted their attention because the ingress had been blocked off, lock-outs being uncommon in aviary circles. $30,000 was found in the disabled car engine, and over a pound of cocaine in the birdhouse.

¶9In denying the motion to suppress, the court stated that defendant was in a no-win position, the items being either within what lawyers term the curtilage, reasonably understood to be within the warrant, United States v. Principe, 499 F.2d 1135 (1st Cir.1974) (outside cabinet “appurtenant” to apartment is within the premises); United States v. Napoli, 530 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir.1976) (car parked in driveway included in “premises”); or in an open field, requiring no warrant. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 1742, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984). At the very least, the officers could be found to be acting in good faith. Cf. United States v. Leon, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3419-20, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). Having in mind defendant’s burdens, both with respect to the magistrate, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2331, 2332-33, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), and the officers, United States v. Leon, ante, the motion to suppress was correctly denied.

¶10So was the motion to acquit. We have examined defendant’s other objections, but find them of no significance.

¶11Affirmed.

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