Mathis v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “at any state of a prosecution for a felony ... the court makes a finding of ability to pay the costs of representation ... the court shall require payment by the person ... of the following costs ...: [rjeasonable attorney's fees if an attorney has been appointed for the person by the court[; and] [c]osts incurred by the county as a result of court appointed legal services rendered to the person.” Section 33-40-3-6 is inapplicable because Wright was not ordered to pay either "reasonable attorney’s fees” or "costs incurred by the county.” Finally, Wright cites Indiana Code Section 33-37-2-3, which allows the court to impose representation costs against a "convicted person” in excess of $100. Section 33-37-2-3 requires a hearing to determine whether the convicted person is indigent, and if "the court determines that a convicted person is able to pay part of the costs of representation, the court shall order the person to pay an amount of not more than the cost of the defense services rendered on behalf of the person.” Section 33-37-2-3 is inapplicable because it applies only to defendants found "not indigent.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Wright v. State

2. “[WJhile Indiana Code Sections 83-9-11.5-6[ 4 ] and 33-19-2-8[ 5 ] grant trial courts the discretion to impose representations costs against a defendant in exeess of one $100, those statutes do not apply in this instance. Indiana Code Section 38-9-11.5-6 applies only in those situations where "the court makes a finding of ability to pay the costs of representation," while Indiana Code Section 338-19-2-38 applies only to those defendants that the court deems "not indigent." Here, the trial court found defendant indigent for the purposes of appointing a public defender and then renewed its indigency finding when it appointed pauper appellate counsel. The trial court never declared Turner "not indigent" or otherwise determined that he had the ability to pay the cost of representation. The only statutory means at the trial court's disposal for imposing costs on Turner was therefore Indiana Code Section 35-33-7-6(c), which caps such costs for a felony at $100. Thus, the trial court exceeded its statutory authority when it assessed Turner a reimbursement fee of more than $100.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Kimbrough v. State

3. “(a) Prior to the completion of the initial hearing, the judicial officer shall determine whether a person who requests assigned counsel is indigent. If the. person is found to be indigent, the judicial officer shall assign counsel to the person. [[Image here]] (c) If the court finds that the person is able to pay part of the cost of representation by the assigned counsel, the court shall order the person to pay the following: (1) For a felony action, a fee of one hundred dollars ($100). (2) For a misdemeanor action, a fee of fifty dollars ($50). The clerk of the court shall deposit fees collected under this subsection in the county’s supplemental public defender services fund established under IC 33-40-3-1. (d) The court may review the finding of indigency at any time during the proceedings.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Berry v. State