776 So. 2d 1188 - State v. Calhoun’s Empirical Analysis
2000
Citation profile
4
cited by 4 later decisions
1
states following
September 2018
most recently cited
4 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Illinois v. Allen · Diaz v. United States · State v. Dorthey · 603 So. 2d 731 - State v. Hearold · 709 So. 2d 672 - State v. Johnson
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Both the federal and state constitutions provide that the accused has the right to counsel of his own choosing to defend him on a criminal charge. However, this right does not permit arbitrary action which obstructs orderly procedures in the courts. Rather the right to choose one's attorney is a right to be exercised at a reasonable time, in a reasonable manner, and at an appropriate stage within the procedural framework of the criminal justice system. There is no constitutional right to make a new choice of counsel on the very date the trial is to begin, with the attendant necessity of a continuance and its disrupting implications to the orderly trial of cases. Once the trial day has arrived, the question of withdrawal of counsel rests largely within the discretion of the trial judge. This court has frequently upheld the trial court's denial of motions for continuances or withdrawal of counsel made on the day of trial when defendant is dissatisfied with his present attorney but had ample opportunity to retain private counsel.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“In State v. Johnson, 97-1906, pp. 6-8 (La.3/4/98); 709 So.2d 672 , 674-77 . . ., the supreme court addressed the circumstances under which State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993), would permit a downward deviation from a statutorily-mandated sentence: In State v. Dorthey, supra, this Court held that a trial court must reduce a defendant's sentence to one not constitutionally excessive if the trial court finds that the sentence mandated by the Habitual Offender Law "makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment," or is nothing more than "the purposeful imposition of pain and suffering" and is "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." Id. at 1280-81 . Finding a mandatory minimum sentence constitutionally excessive requires much more, though, than the mere utterance of the phrases above. A sentencing judge must always start with the presumption that a mandatory minimum sentence under the Habitual Offender Law is constitutional. See State v. Dorthey, supra at 1281 (Marcus, J., concurring); State v. Young, supra [94-1346 (La. App. 4 Cir. 10/26/95); 663 So.2d 525 ]. A court may only depart from the minimum sentence if it finds that there is clear and convincing evidence in the particular case before it which would rebut this presumption of constitutionality. A trial judge may not rely solely upon the non-violent nature of the instant crime or of past crimes as evidence which justifies rebutting the presumption of constitutionality. While the ”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Colton“It's a short case. Unfortunately it's one that we've seen many times, I guess, in this state of affairs that we have; domestic violence. And I want you to punish him for what anybody else does to anybody else.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.