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← 777 F.2d 198 - Young v. Herring

Young v. Herring’s Empirical Analysis

777 F.2d 198 · 1985

Citation profile

29
cited by 29 later decisions
1
states following
January 2008
most recently cited

20 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 29 later decisions — most recently January 2008 · most notably Young v. Herring (1991), United States v. Blackwell (1997)

20 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

190198519902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · Wainwright v. Sykes · Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay · Catlin v. United States · Harris v. Nelson

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Although the Mississippi Supreme Court did not expressly state that Young's motion for new trial came too late, that is obviously implicit in its holding that Young procedurally defaulted, and in its refusal, for that reason, to rule on the merits of his claim of improperly suggestive pre-trial identification. As indicated in the [Mississippi Supreme] Court’s opinion, it clearly determined that Young was afforded ample opportunity to go into the matter during trial.... Likewise, ... the state argued in its brief to the Mississippi Supreme Court that Young had waived the claim by not raising it until after verdict. Further, the law of Mississippi is clear that, where the matter could have been raised during trial, raising it for the first time by motion after verdict is too late.... In these circumstances, we treat the Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion as if it had expressly stated that raising the matter for the first time by motion for new trial was, under these facts, too late to preserve it.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “in the Sykes sense, that is independent of the merits, as the Mississippi Supreme Court never reached the merits because of the procedural default.... Plainly, the requirement for a correct contemporaneous objection is an”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[Young] does not show adequate cause why he failed to raise the improperly suggestive pre-trial identification process claim during trial, and because his failure to so raise it was the reason the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to grant relief in respect thereto, that claim is not reviewable in a federal habeas proceeding. ‡ s|< s|8 a)s * sjc The Mississippi Supreme Court decided that Young did not timely object to the identification procedure, providing an adequate and independent state procedural ground for refusal to consider his due process claim.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.