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← 777 F.2d 272 - Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn

Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn’s Empirical Analysis

777 F.2d 272 · 1985

Citation profile

74
cited by 74 later decisions
3
states following
August 2014
most recently cited

31 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 74 later decisions — most recently August 2014 · most notably Barrientes v. Johnson (2000), Jones v. Butler (1988)

31 federal appellate · 4 state decisions

3101985199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 753

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Chapman v. State of California · United States v. Bagley · United States v. Agurs · McMann v. Richardson

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 74 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The test applied to determine whether a trial error makes a trial fundamentally unfair is whether there is a reasonable probability that the verdict might have been different had the trial been properly conducted.”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “There is such unfairness only if the prosecutor's remarks evince 'either persistent and pronounced misconduct or ... the evidence was so insubstantial that (in probability) but for the remarks no conviction would have occurred'”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Neither Enmund nor our three decisions interpreting it make the use of the words "lethal force" talismanic. Enmund's teaching is that a person may not be sentenced to death for the death-dealing act of another unless he shares culpability for the homicide. The words "lethal force" as employed in Enmund make it clear, however, that the defendant will not be absolved if he contemplates "that lethal force will be employed by others." While the death penalty may not "be imposed for vicarious felony murder ...," it may be imposed on one who knowingly participates in a course of action that contemplates the use of lethal force, even if one is not the triggerman. Imposition of the death penalty, Enmund instructs, depends "on the degree of [the defendant's] culpability — what [his] intentions, expectations, and actions were." When the defendant himself acts with the intention of inflicting great bodily harm and either killed the victim or was a principal in his killing and was engaged in or was a principal in the commission of robbery, he has acted with personal culpability. Indeed lethal force might be employed without the intention of inflicting great bodily harm, for example, by the use of a firearm to shoot at the victim without intending to cause his death or serious injury. When a defendant personally intends to inflict great bodily harm and succeeds in producing death, his personal involvement and individual culpability is sufficiently established that the capital sentence is ”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.