Coleman v. Kemp’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

54 federal appellate · 4 district · 43 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 132 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Prejudice is presumed from pretrial publicity when pretrial publicity is sufficiently prejudicial and inflammatory and the prejudicial pretrial publicity saturated the community where the trials were held. . . . The presumed prejudice principle is `rare[ly]' applicable, and is reserved for an `extreme situation.'"”

   8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Schneider v. Delo · Cherry v. State

2. “" 'At the outset, we emphasize the fact that the presumptive prejudice standard recognized in Rideau [ v. Louisiana , 373 U.S. 723 , 83 S.Ct. 1417 , 10 L.Ed.2d 663 (1963)] is only "rarely" applicable. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart , 427 U.S. 539 , 554 , 96 S.Ct. 2791 , 2800 , 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1986), and is reserved for an "extreme situation." Mayola v. State of Alabama , 623 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1980). In short, the burden placed upon the petitioner to show that pretrial publicity deprived him of the right to a fair trial before an impartial jury is an extremely heavy one.' " " Coleman v. Kemp , 778 F.2d 1487 , 1537 (11th Cir. 1985)."”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cherry v. State · 661 So. 2d 789 - Beard v. State

3. “The trial court may be unable to seat an impartial jury because of prejudicial pretrial publicity or an inflamed community atmosphere. In such a case, due process requires the trial court to grant defendant’s motion for a change of venue. This does not mean, however, that a defendant is entitled to a change of venue whenever potential jurors have been exposed to the facts of the case. It is not required that jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case. This is particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror’s impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. A defendant is entitled to a change of venue if he can demonstrate either “actual prejudice” or “presumed prejudice.” To find the existence of actual prejudice, two basic prerequisites must be satisfied. First, it must be shown that one or more jurors who decided the case entertained an opinion, before hearin”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Gaskin v. Secretary, Department of Corrections · Marsden v. Moore