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← 778 F.2d 933 - United States v. Jackson

United States v. Jackson’s Empirical Analysis

778 F.2d 933 · 1985

Citation profile

35
cited by 35 later decisions
1
states following
June 2025
most recently cited

19 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 35 later decisions — most recently June 2025 · most notably United States v. Carpenter (1986), United States v. Medina (1991)

19 federal appellate · 1 district · 1 state decisions

17019851990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 846 (§ 406 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 26 U.S.C. § 7201

Relies on Terry v. Ohio · Chimel v. California · Florida v. Royer · Adams v. Williams · Ashe v. Swenson

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “a very quick and limited pass through the premises to check for third persons who may destroy evidence.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Mespoulede was essentially a replay of Kramer . After trial on a two-count indictment, the jury had acquitted Mespoulede on a count charging him with possessing cocaine with intent to distribute; it failed to agree on a verdict on the other count charging him with conspiring to distribute cocaine. We held that at the retrial of the conspiracy count, the prosecution should have been precluded from introducing the evidence with respect to possession which the jury had necessarily rejected at the first trial— even though the government was not required to establish possession in order to prove a conspiracy to distribute. ****** United States v. Clark reveals the other side of the coin. There, as here, the appellants had first been acquitted on a conspiracy charge ... but the jury failed to agree on substantive counts charging them with illegal importation. ****** When the first trial results in an acquittal on the conspiracy charge, generally there is no way of telling whether the basis for acquittal was disbelief of some portion of the Government’s evidence, and what that portion might have been, or whether the jury simply regarded the evidence as insufficient to prove an agreement, especially when, as here and in Clark , the Government’s evidence did not place the retried defendant at the center of the conspiracy. * * * There can thus be no general principle that, after acquittal on a conspiracy count, the Government may not retry a defendant on a related substantive count.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Application of the principle inevitably has two phases. The first is to determine what the first judgment determined, a process in which ... the court must look not simply to the pleadings but to the record in the prior trial. The second is to examine how that determination bears on the second case.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.