778 So. 2d 842 - Siebert v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"`Siebert argues on appeal that his petition should not be barred by the two-year limitations period in Rule 32.2(c) for the following reasons: "`. . . . "`2. The State waived this affirmative defense by failing to raise it in its first responsive pleading. "`. . . . "`Claim 2, asserting that Rule 32.2(c) must be raised as an affirmative defense in the first responsive pleading or it is waived, is without merit.... "`. . . . "`... [N]otwithstanding the requirement of Rule 32.3 that the State "shall have the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion," this court has repeatedly stated that "[w]here a simple reading of a petition for post-conviction relief shows that, assuming the allegations of the petition to be true, it is obviously without merit or is precluded, the trial court may summarily dismiss the petition without requiring any response from the state." Burton v. State, 728 So.2d 1142, 1148 (Ala.Cr. App.1998) (citing Bishop v. State, 608 So.2d 345 (Ala.1992), and Patty v. State, 652 So.2d 337 (Ala.Cr.App. 1994)) (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court could have dismissed the petition on procedural grounds even without any response from the State.'”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 783 So. 2d 135 - Williams v. State · 847 So. 2d 386 - Ex Parte Hutcherson

2. “"[T]he court shall not entertain any petition for relief from a conviction or sentence on the grounds specified in Rule 32.1 (a) and (f) , unless the petition is filed: (1) In the case of a conviction appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, within two (2) years after the issuance of the certificate of judgment by the Court of Criminal Appeals under Rule 41, A. R. App. P. . . ."”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 783 So. 2d 135 - Williams v. State · 847 So. 2d 386 - Ex Parte Hutcherson

3. “"The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that Pierce had failed to prove that his evidence regarding the sheriff's improper contact with the jury constituted newly discovered evidence; therefore, it held, the trial court correctly held this claim to be procedurally barred on the basis that it could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that Pierce did not satisfy the following three of the five elements required by Rule 32.1(e), Ala.R.Crim.P.: 1) that the information was not known and could not have been discovered at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to raise it in a posttrial motion; 2) that if the information `had been known at the time of trial or of sentencing, the result probably would have been different'; and 3) that `[t]he facts establish that the [defendant] is innocent of the crime' or that he `should not have received the sentence [he] received.' "However, Pierce was not required to prove that this information meets the elements of `newly discovered material facts' under Rule 32.1(e). While the information about Sheriff Whittle's contacts with the jury may be `newly discovered,' Pierce does not seek relief under Rule 32.1(e). Pierce does not contend that `[n]ewly discovered material facts exist which require that the conviction or sentence be vacated by the court.' Rule 32.1(e). Instead, Pierce's claim fits under Rule 32.1(a): `The constitution of the United States or of the State of Alabama requires a new trial. .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 805 So. 2d 763 - Ex Parte Dobyne